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ABSTRACT
This Article examines the methods of statutory interpretation used
by the lower federal courts, especially the federal district courts, and
compares those methods to the practices of the U.S. Supreme Court.
This novel research reveals both similarities across courts and some
striking differences. The research shows that some interpretive tools are
highly overrepresented in the Supreme Court’s decisions, while other
tools are much more prevalent in the lower courts. Differences in
prevalence persist even after accounting for the selection effect that
stems from the Supreme Court’s discretionary docket. Another
finding—based on a study of 40 years of cases from all three levels of
the federal judiciary—is that all federal courts have shifted toward
more frequent use of textualist tools in recent decades. However, that
shift has been less pronounced as one moves down the judicial
hierarchy.
The divergence between the interpretive practices of different federal
courts has implications for both descriptive and normative accounts of
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statutory interpretation. On the descriptive side, most beliefs about
statutory interpretation are based on the narrow and unrepresentative
slice of judicial business conducted in the Supreme Court, but some of
those beliefs turn out to be incorrect or incomplete as descriptions of
statutory interpretation more generally. This research therefore
substantially improves our understanding of the complex reality of
judicial statutory interpretation. On the normative side, the results of
this research can advance scholarly and judicial debates over whether
lower courts should conduct statutory interpretation differently than
the Supreme Court and whether the Court’s interpretive methodology
should be binding on lower courts. This Article’s findings also suggest
that the teaching of statutory interpretation should take into account the
distinctive practices of the lower courts, where the vast majority of legal
work is done.
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INTRODUCTION
Scholarship on statutory interpretation has traditionally focused
on the U.S. Supreme Court. This narrow view is unfortunate because
the Court’s docket is a tiny and unrepresentative slice of the business
of the federal courts, not to mention the business of the broader
dispute-resolution system that includes state courts, administrative
agencies, prosecutors, and private actors. The Court’s atypicality
threatens the relevance of normative theory that takes the Court as its
model or its intended target. Worse still is the risk that scholars and
litigators will embrace a distorted view of how statutory interpretation
is conducted. It is therefore a positive development that several
scholars have in recent years turned their attention to the interpretive
practices of other courts, in particular the federal courts of appeals and
several state supreme courts.1
Nonetheless, our nascent knowledge of the lower courts’ practices
remains dwarfed by our ignorance. The most important gap in our
knowledge concerns the federal district courts. Their interpretive
practices have not been studied in any systematic way, though there
have been a few limited studies on topics such as district courts’
interpretation of the tax code or other specific kinds of statutes.2 This
1. On the federal courts of appeals, see generally FRANK B. CROSS, THE THEORY AND
PRACTICE OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 180–200 (2008); James J. Brudney & Lawrence
Baum, Protean Statutory Interpretation in the Courts of Appeals, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 681
(2017) [hereinafter Brudney & Baum, Protean Statutory Interpretation]; Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl,
Communicating the Canons: How Lower Courts React When the Supreme Court Changes the Rules
of Statutory Interpretation, 100 MINN. L. REV. 481 (2015); and Abbe R. Gluck & Richard A.
Posner, Statutory Interpretation on the Bench: A Survey of Forty-Two Judges on the Federal Courts
of Appeals, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1298 (2018). For an examination of several state supreme courts,
see generally Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation:
Methodological Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750 (2010).
2. See, e.g., James P. Nehf, Textualism in the Lower Courts: Lessons from Judges
Interpreting Consumer Legislation, 26 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 33–81 (1994) (consumer cases in state and
lower federal courts); Daniel M. Schneider, Empirical Research on Judicial Reasoning: Statutory

BRUHL IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

4

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

9/26/2018 10:39 AM

[Vol. 68:1

Article surveys the previously hidden bulk of the iceberg by studying
the interpretive practices of the lower federal courts, with a particular
emphasis on the district courts. This Article also compares those
practices to the practices of the Supreme Court.
There is good reason to suspect that statutory interpretation in the
lower courts would be different than interpretation in the Supreme
Court. In the busy lower courts, especially in the district courts, one
would expect terse applications of precedent and plain language to be
the rule, rather than the lengthy explorations of competing canons and
obscure sources that are the usual stuff of the Supreme Court’s
opinions. For a hint of the kind of divergences that systematic study
might reveal, consider the paths of what are arguably the four most
notable Supreme Court statutory-interpretation cases of the last five
years: King v. Burwell,3 the Affordable Care Act subsidies case; Yates
v. United States,4 the undersized-fish case; Bond v. United States,5 the
case of adultery and a chemically burned thumb; and Lockhart v.
United States,6 a sentencing case that was watched closely by
interpretation mavens.7 In two of these four blockbusters-to-be,
namely Lockhart and Bond, there was no written opinion in the district
court, only an oral ruling from the bench. In the Supreme Court,
Lockhart generated dueling opinions from Justices Sotomayor and
Kagan, both of whom wielded grammar canons, statutory structure,
legislative history, and the rule of lenity. The district judge, by contrast,
had made short work of the issue that would vex the Justices, rejecting
the defendant’s argument about the statute’s coverage by stating
during a hearing, “I’m ruling that the plain reading of the statute
Interpretation in Federal Tax Cases, 31 N.M. L. REV. 325, 338–51 (2001) (federal tax cases in
district courts).
3. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015).
4. Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074 (2015).
5. Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077 (2014).
6. Lockhart v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 958 (2016).
7. These are the four Supreme Court cases set out as principal cases in the statutoryinterpretation chapters of the 2016 supplement to what is generally regarded as the leading book
in the field, WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR., JAMES J. BRUDNEY & JOSH CHAFETZ, 2016
SUPPLEMENT TO CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION AND REGULATION: STATUTES AND
THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY vi (2016). All four of these cases have generated significant
scholarly and blogospheric commentary. See, e.g., Richard M. Re, The New Holy Trinity, 18
GREEN BAG 2D 407 (2015) (discussing King, Yates, and Bond); Asher Steinberg, Lockhart v.
United States—Argument Recap, and Ruminations on Canon Entrepreneurship, Legal
Indeterminacy, and Legislative History, THE NARROWEST GROUNDS (Nov. 7, 2015, 1:16 PM),
http://narrowestgrounds.blogspot.com/2015/11/lockhart-v-united-states-argument-recap.html
[https://perma.cc/TVC9-C63P].

BRUHL IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2018]

STATUTORY INTERPRETATION

9/26/2018 10:39 AM

5

negates [the defendant’s] position.”8 The district judge in Bond, who
likewise ruled from the bench, did not even address the federalismtinged version of the canon of constitutional avoidance that the
Supreme Court would later use to justify its narrow construction of the
federal chemical-weapons statute.9
Unlike those two cases, Yates did generate a written opinion in the
district court, albeit a brief one. Mr. Yates, a fisherman charged with
destruction of evidence by throwing fish overboard, moved for
acquittal on the ground that the statute at issue reached only the
destruction of things like documents, not the undersized fish he had
caught.10 The district court disagreed in a single paragraph.11 The
opinion relied on circuit precedent showing that the statute swept more
broadly than the document-shredding scenarios that Congress seemed
to have had in mind.12 On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit’s analysis of the
statute’s application to fish was limited to one paragraph that relied on
what it regarded as the unambiguous ordinary meaning of the statutory
phrase “tangible object.”13 That paragraph cited a dictionary definition
of “tangible” but did not discuss the various linguistic canons and
legislative intent arguments that would so occupy the Supreme Court.14
The outlier of the four cases is King, as the interpretive work in
that case looked roughly similar at every level of the system. It was
clear from the start that the legality of the Affordable Care Act’s
subsidies would, through one case or another, soon reach the Supreme
Court. Starting in the district court, the briefing in King was expert and
extensive, with the challengers already being represented by the
appellate specialist who would later represent them in the Supreme
Court.15 Several amicus briefs were filed even in the district court.16 The
district court issued an opinion headed for publication in the Federal
8. Transcript of Sentencing, United States v. Lockhart, No. 11-CR-231 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 1,
2013), reprinted in Joint Appendix at 43–45, Lockhart, 136 S. Ct. 958 (No. 14-8358), 2015 WL
4550240.
9. Motions Hearing, United States v. Bond, No. 07-CR-528 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 19, 2007),
reprinted in Petition for Writ of Certiorari at App-26, Bond, 564 U.S. 211 (No. 09-1227), 2010 WL
1506717.
10. United States v. Yates, No. 2:10-CR-66-FTM-29SPC, 2011 WL 3444093, at *1 (M.D. Fla.
Aug. 8, 2011) (citing United States v. Hunt, 526 F.3d 739, 744 (11th Cir. 2008)).
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. United States v. Yates, 733 F.3d 1059, 1064 (11th Cir. 2013).
14. Id.
15. King v. Sebelius, 997 F. Supp. 2d 415, 418 (E.D. Va. 2014).
16. Docket Sheet, King, 997 F. Supp. 2d 415 (No. 13-CV-006300-JRS).
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Supplement 2d, itself a rare event, and upheld the subsidies in a
thorough opinion that addressed the Chevron17 deference doctrine,
“whole-act” arguments, the superfluity canon, a federalism clearstatement rule, legislative history, and Congressional Budget Office
analyses.18 The court of appeals used most of the same tools and upheld
the Government’s position under Chevron.19 The Supreme Court also
ultimately upheld the Affordable Care Act subsidies.20 Probably the
most striking difference between the Supreme Court’s opinion and
those that preceded it involved the role of Chevron deference, which
the lower courts employed but the Supreme Court pointedly did not
apply.21
Four cases amount to no more than anecdote, but the much larger
study undertaken for this Article shows that divergence between the
interpretive practices of the Supreme Court and the lower courts is real
and systematic. I examined the use of over 20 interpretive tools at each
level of the federal judiciary. For some particularly important tools, I
examined a period of 40 years. The rest of the tools were studied across
a decade. I also scrutinized in greater depth the last five years of
Supreme Court decisions together with the opinions of the district
courts and courts of appeals in those same cases. No remotely
comparable study of the district courts’ interpretive practices has been
undertaken before. This study also substantially extends the modest
existing research on the courts of appeals and, to allow comparisons
across tiers of the judiciary, conducts novel research on the Supreme
Court as well.
To preview, one overarching finding of this Article is that courts
at different levels of the system are both doing different things and
doing things differently. That is, the lower courts spend only a small
part of their time resolving the difficult interpretive questions that
make up much of the Supreme Court’s docket. But even when the
lower courts do confront those same questions, the lower courts’
practices meaningfully diverge from the Supreme Court’s practices.
There are also several subsidiary findings that engage with important
debates in the literature. These include the following results:
First, although the lower courts and the Supreme Court all shifted

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
King, 997 F. Supp. 2d at 426–32.
King v. Burwell, 759 F.3d 358, 376 (4th Cir. 2014).
King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015).
Id. at 2489.
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toward textualist tools starting in the late-1980s, the change was
dampened and less transformative at each step further down the
judicial hierarchy.
Second, there are significant differences across the judicial
hierarchy in the frequency with which interpretive tools are used.
Almost every interpretive canon or source, except for precedent, is
used much less in lower courts, but that effect does not apply to all tools
equally. For example, some canons are “top-heavy”—that is, highly
overrepresented in the Supreme Court. Other tools are relatively more
common further down the hierarchy, making those tools “bottomheavy.” Legislative history is commonly used at all levels, but courts
differ in which kinds of legislative history they use, with the lower
courts heavily emphasizing the most accessible and authoritative kinds.
Third, the results reveal another form of unpredictability in
statutory interpretation. Even within a single case, different
interpretive canons are used as the case moves through the judicial
system. There are many cases in which the Supreme Court’s analytical
tools did not appear at all in the opinions of the court of appeals or the
district court.
Fourth, some canons display lifecycles in which they are initially
prominent in the Supreme Court and then gradually spread through
the rest of the system. This pattern characterizes the federalism canons
of the Rehnquist era, for example.
In light of the findings just summarized, one can fairly conclude
that the tip of the iceberg is not representative of the whole. This
divergence between the interpretive practices of different federal
courts has implications for both the descriptive and the normative
literatures on statutory interpretation. On the descriptive side, many
beliefs and assumptions that correctly describe the Supreme Court’s
practices are wrong or incomplete as a description of the rest of the
system. On the normative side, there is a growing literature on whether
lower federal courts and state courts should do statutory interpretation
differently than the Supreme Court.22 Normative prescriptions should

22. See, e.g., Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Hierarchy and Heterogeneity: How to Read a Statute
in a Lower Court, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 433 (2012) (arguing that statutory interpretation should
differ across courts according to each court’s particular institutional circumstances); AaronAndrew P. Bruhl & Ethan J. Leib, Elected Judges and Statutory Interpretation, 79 U. CHI. L. REV.
1215 (2012) (proposing that statutory interpretation should differ depending on whether a judge
is elected or appointed); Michael Coenen & Seth Davis, Minor Courts, Major Questions, 70
VAND. L. REV. 777 (2017) (arguing that only the Supreme Court should apply the “major
questions exception” to the Chevron doctrine, see supra note 17 and accompanying text); Ethan
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proceed from a robust account of actual practices, especially where
those practices are driven by relatively fixed institutional constraints.23
A better understanding of the lower courts’ practices may alter
normative prescriptions or at least allow for the gap between
prescription and reality to be more accurately measured.
This Article’s findings also have practical implications for the
teaching of statutory interpretation in law schools. The Supreme Court
will, and probably should, remain the focus of statutory-interpretation
pedagogy. Its decisions offer the richest debates, and its work serves as
a model and guide for other courts. Old favorites like Holy Trinity24
and new classics like King v. Burwell25 provide a vocabulary that
lawyers should know. But teaching students that the lower courts are
different is necessary to ensure that students are well prepared to
practice in the courts in which virtually all students will spend much
more time than they will spend litigating in the Supreme Court.
This Article is organized as follows. Part I uses existing
understandings of judicial institutions and judicial behavior to explain
why the interpretive practices of the lower courts, especially the district
courts, can be expected to diverge from the practices of the Supreme
Court. Setting out these expectations is important because it can direct
the investigation of the lower courts’ practices—a potentially massive
topic—toward particular hypotheses and key questions.
Part II presents the findings and reaches generalizations about
lower-court interpretation. There is no single right methodology for
studying interpretive approaches, but a sound strategy is to use
multiple techniques, acknowledge their strengths and weaknesses, and
put the most confidence in results that persist across techniques. This
Article uses several distinct techniques. One approach is to examine

Leib, Localist Statutory Interpretation, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 897, 910–929 (2013) (arguing that local
judges should have discretion in interpreting local laws and ambiguous state statutes); Jeffrey A.
Pojanowski, Statutes in Common Law Courts, 91 TEX. L. REV. 479 (2013) (arguing that state
courts with common-law powers should interpret statutes differently than federal courts).
23. See Frank H. Easterbrook, The Absence of Method in Statutory Interpretation, 84 U. CHI.
L. REV. 81, 96 (2017) (observing that “[r]ules of interpretation must reflect the resources available
to the task”); see also KENT GREENAWALT, STATUTORY AND COMMON LAW INTERPRETATION
13–16 (2013) (emphasizing the importance of combining conceptual insights and institutional
realities); infra Part I.B.1 (describing institutional factors like caseloads and resource disparities).
See generally Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions, 101 MICH. L.
REV. 885 (2003) (arguing that an institution’s interpretive approach should reflect its capacities
and role).
24. Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892).
25. 135 S. Ct. 2480.
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the rates and ratios at which various tools are used in different courts.
This comparison reveals which interpretive tools are the most
overrepresented and underrepresented in the lower courts as
compared to the Supreme Court. This Article also uses a “matchedcorpus method” in which a smaller group of cases is closely examined
at all three levels of the federal judicial system. This method shows that
interpretive differences across courts persist even within a single case
with a fixed set of facts and statutory provisions. Part II also tracks
several especially important tools over several decades to see how their
use has evolved at different levels of the judiciary. Finally, Part II
explains how the findings require reassessment of some conventional
truths found in the Supreme Court–oriented literature.
This Article concludes with recommendations for future lines of
normative and descriptive scholarship, suggestions for courts and
attorneys about how they might respond to interpretive divergence,
and a call for instructors to reorient their pedagogical priorities.
I. WHAT LOWER-COURT INTERPRETATION SHOULD LOOK LIKE:
TENTATIVE HYPOTHESES AND KEY UNANSWERED QUESTIONS
The goal of this research, stated in broad terms, is to determine
whether and in what respects the interpretive practices of the lower
courts, especially the federal district courts, differ from the practices of
the U.S. Supreme Court.26 This topic is broad, but the existing
theoretical and empirical literature, together with knowledge of the
institutional features of the courts, can identify subjects of particular
importance and suggest tentative hypotheses to investigate.
Accordingly, this Part generates some predictions and identifies some
key questions about lower-court interpretation. The first step in that
effort is to explain why a degree of interpretive divergence across
26. This Article does not explore methodological divergences between different courts at
the same level of the system, such as different circuits or different federal districts. Different
circuits and districts have somewhat different case mixes, which make different canons and tools
more or less relevant to their work. Beyond that, the uneven timing of judicial retirements means
that presidents will make their mark on some courts faster and more deeply than on others,
leading to temporary ideologically generated differences. And purely by happenstance, an
entrepreneurial judge or two can create a distinctive local interpretive culture. Cf. Brudney &
Baum, Protean Statutory Interpretation, supra note 1, at 726–27 (conjecturing that the antipathy
to dictionaries of Judges Easterbrook and Posner may explain the low rate of dictionary use on
the Seventh Circuit). Nor does this study examine judge-level characteristics, such as age, party
of appointing president, and pre-appointment career. Some of the variables discussed in this
footnote could well be expected to influence interpretive methods, but the investigation here is
limited to the differences across tiers of the judiciary.
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courts is possible.
A. The Opportunity for Divergence and Limits on It
There are limits on the amount of divergence in interpretive
practices that one could reasonably expect to see from courts within
the same hierarchy. This is so for several reasons. To begin with, to the
extent that methodological choices drive bottom-line results, a
hierarchical judicial system could not tolerate interpretive differences
so vast that they routinely led to reversals on appeal. That would be
the equivalent of a factory in which the workers on the assembly line
paint widgets red, only to have the quality-control inspectors at the end
of the line repaint them all green. Further, at least some lower-court
judges regard certain aspects of interpretive methodology as being
subject to the Supreme Court’s direction.27 Perhaps more important
than any formal supervisory control, however, is the fact that members
of the federal judiciary are engaged in a shared enterprise, with the
Supreme Court providing the leading example of their common craft.28
Finally, judges and the attorneys who argue before them are all
exposed to the broader legal culture’s intellectual currents, such as the
shift toward textualism and interpretive formalism that has occurred in
recent decades.29 All of those forces push courts toward conformity.
Nonetheless, several countervailing factors allow and even
encourage interpretive divergence. First, although some fundamentals
of interpretation are widely embraced—for example, that the text is
ordinarily the most important consideration—there is no consensus on
a single “right way” to do statutory interpretation.30 No court, and not
27. See generally Gluck & Posner, supra note 1, at 1331–32, 1343–46 (reporting that most of
the judges in their survey did not believe the Supreme Court’s methods were binding, though the
judges made exceptions for Chevron and some substantive canons); Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl,
What Would It Mean to Have Methodological Stare Decisis (and Do We Already Have It)?
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (showing that there is more evidence of
methodological stare decisis than has generally been appreciated).
28. See LAWRENCE BAUM, JUDGES AND THEIR AUDIENCES 97–104, 112–14 (2006); see also
THE SUPREME COURT’S STYLE GUIDE iii (Jack Metzler ed. 2016) (writing that the Court’s
opinions “are natural exemplars for judges of other courts and for lawyers who seek to improve
by emulating the very best the legal profession has to offer”).
29. See Paul Clement, Editorial, Arguing Before Justice Scalia, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2016
(describing Justice Scalia’s influence on interpretive advocacy); Marty Lederman, Textualism?
Purposivism? The Chief Justice Comes Down on the Side of Interpretive Pragmatism, SLATE (June
25, 2015, 4: 26 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/the_breakfast_table/
features/2015/scotus_roundup/supreme_court_2015_john_roberts_ruling_in_king_v_burwell.ht
ml[https://perma.cc/5NJ9-Y2UT] (similar).
30. GREENAWALT, supra note 23, at 43; Brudney & Baum, Protean Statutory Interpretation,
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even any single judge, is completely consistent in interpretive approach
from case to case. When appellate courts are themselves impure and
inconsistent, it is hard for them to impose interpretive discipline on
lower courts; it is likewise hard for those lower courts to know what
rules they are supposed to follow, assuming obedience is even their
goal.
Second, even where interpretive doctrines are widely embraced,
the doctrines often take the form of fuzzy standards or factors of
indeterminate weight. For example, many canons take the form of
presumptions that are rebuttable by “enough” contrary evidence, and
many doctrines apply only when the text is “ambiguous.”31 Such
doctrines allow reasonably divergent applications, and noncompliance
is hard to detect.32
Third, the potential enforcers of uniformity in interpretation have
relatively weak incentives to do so. Litigants—that is, potential
appellants and petitioners—are understandably focused on who wins,
not which interpretive tools were used to get to the bottom line. The
Supreme Court’s concern is admittedly broader; the Court cares not so
much about specific case outcomes as about whether lower courts are
giving a statute a consistent meaning.33 However, the link between
interpretive methods and interpretive outputs is loose enough34 that
policing methodology per se is not an immediate imperative for the
Court. Would the Court grant certiorari on a statutory question of no
great policy significance that the lower courts had all decided the same
way, just so that the Court could repudiate a lower court’s
methodology while affirming the ultimate holding? Similarly, would
the Court fail to grant certiorari on an otherwise cert-worthy circuit
split, just because the lower courts had all used the same method, even
the “correct” method? In both cases the answer is almost certainly no.
Fourth, interpretive methodology is not regarded as binding to the
same extent that precedents normally bind.35 Thus, even if reviewing

supra note 1, at 691.
31. See Brett M. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2118, 2135–
38 (2016) (book review).
32. See Frank Cross, Tonja Jacobi & Emerson Tiller, A Positive Political Theory of Rules
and Standards, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 14–18 (2012).
33. See Amanda Frost, Overvaluing Uniformity, 94 VA. L. REV. 1567, 1630–39 (2008).
34. See Brudney & Baum, Protean Statutory Interpretation, supra note 1, at 692; Jason J.
Czarnezki & William K. Ford, The Phantom Philosophy? An Empirical Investigation of Legal
Interpretation, 65 MD. L. REV. 841, 882 (2006).
35. Gluck & Posner, supra note 1, at 1343–44; Bruhl, supra note 27.
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courts themselves regularized their practices and purported to issue
binding methodological edicts, it is not clear that lower courts would
be legally required to obey them.
B. Causes of Divergence and Which Divergences They Encourage
For the reasons just set out, there is room for interpretive
divergence across the tiers of the judiciary, albeit within limits. More
than that, there are affirmative reasons to expect divergence and to
expect it to take particular forms. We can divide the factors that
encourage methodological divergence into a few categories:
differences in institutional context, differences in judicial preferences,
and time-lag effects. The following subsections elaborate on these
drivers of divergence and explain how they might influence
interpretive practices.
1. Institutional Context and Capacity. Courts are decision-making
systems composed not just of judges, but also of court staff, attorneys,
and others. These actors interact within structures and informational
architectures that vary from court to court. We can expect divergences
in interpretive methods to arise from the institutional differences
between courts at different levels of the federal system. This is a large
category of influences that naturally divides into a few subcategories.
a. Resources. The resources available for making legal decisions
are abundant at the top of the judicial system and decrease as one
moves down the pyramid. The Supreme Court’s oral-argument docket
has recently consisted of only around 70 cases per year.36 Each of those
cases receives the attention of nine experienced judges, each of whom
is assisted by resourceful librarians and several highly capable clerks.
The briefing and arguments before the Court are increasingly
presented by Supreme Court experts.37 Almost every case attracts
amicus briefs that present additional arguments, information, and
perspectives.38 When the United States is not a party, the Solicitor

36. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR: JUDICIAL
BUSINESS OF THE U.S. COURTS tbl.A-1 (2017) [hereinafter JUDICIAL BUSINESS],
http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/judicial-business-2017-tables [https://perma.cc/DT8TARD9].
37. Richard J. Lazarus, Advocacy Matters Before and Within the Supreme Court:
Transforming the Court by Transforming the Bar, 96 GEO. L.J. 1487, 1557 (2008).
38. Allison Orr Larsen & Neal Devins, The Amicus Machine, 102 VA. L. REV. 1901, 1902–
04 (2016); Anthony J. Franze & R. Reeves Anderson, In Unusual Term, Big Year for Amicus
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General frequently files amicus briefs that are prized for their
deliberation and evenhandedness.39 This is a resource-rich
environment, inside and out, and that richness shows itself in the
Court’s work product; the decisions are usually lengthy and full of
interpretive thrusts and parries, and they often feature multiple
opinions sparring over the key points.40
The decision-making environment is less favorable in the courts of
appeals. The caseload is much higher, so the amount of time available
for each case is tightly constricted.41 Most cases do not get oral
argument but are instead decided only on the briefs, often with
minimal collegial deliberation.42 The quality of briefing is lower on
average.43 The parties often fail to make the right arguments and
present the best information, but the cases must be decided anyway
because jurisdiction is almost entirely mandatory.44 Amicus briefs,
which might fill the gaps in the parties’ presentations, are uncommon.45
Even a judge as able as Judge Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit
admits feeling pushed to the edge of his competence.46

Curiae at the Supreme Court, NAT’L L.J. (Sept. 21, 2016).
39. See Margaret Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray, The Solicitor General’s Changing
Role in Supreme Court Litigation, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1323, 1353–60 (2010) (providing statistics on
the Solicitor General’s participation).
40. See LEE EPSTEIN, JEFFREY A. SEGAL, HAROLD J. SPAETH & THOMAS G. WALKER, THE
SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM: DATA, DECISION, AND DEVELOPMENTS 252–57 tbl.3-2, 258–63
tbl.3-3, 264–65 tbl.3-4 (6th ed. 2015) (reporting data on the number and length of opinions).
41. See BRYAN A. GARNER, CARLOS BEA, REBECCA WHITE BERCH, NEIL M. GORSUCH,
HARRIS L. HARTZ, NATHAN L. HECHT, BRETT M. KAVANAUGH, ALEX KOZINSKI, SANDRA L.
LYNCH, WILLIAM H. PRYOR, JR., THOMAS M. REAVLEY, JEFFREY S. SUTTON & DIANE P.
WOOD, THE LAW OF JUDICIAL PRECEDENT 257 (2016); Easterbrook, supra note 23, at 95–96.
42. See JUDICIAL BUSINESS, supra note 36, tbl.B-10 (showing that 80 percent of cases before
the federal courts of appeals were decided without argument). To be sure, not every case requires
much deliberation; some appeals are near frivolous. Still, capacity constraints are the reason that
streamlined decision-making practices became so prevalent, so it is reasonable to suppose that in
a richer environment some of the cases would receive better and more elaborated dispositions.
See generally WILLIAM M. RICHMAN & WILLIAM L. REYNOLDS, INJUSTICE ON APPEAL: THE
UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS IN CRISIS 83–127 (2012) (describing various efficiency
measures courts of appeals have adopted in response to docket pressures).
43. See, e.g., Interview with Justice Stephen G. Breyer, 13 SCRIBES J. LEGAL WRITING 145,
160 (2010) (assessing briefing in the Supreme Court as “pretty uniformly good” and stating that
“[y]ou’ll get very good briefs in the circuits on a lesser number of occasions”).
44. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2012) (assigning the courts of appeals mandatory jurisdiction over
most final decisions of district courts).
45. See Linda Sandstrom Simard, An Empirical Study of Amici Curiae in Federal Court: A
Fine Balance of Access, Efficiency, and Adversarialism, 27 REV. LITIG. 669, 686–87 (2008).
46. See Easterbrook, supra note 23, at 95–97 (describing the common assumption that judges
have unlimited time to deliberate as “a bunch of baloney!”).
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The environment for legal decision-making is least favorable of all
in the busy and often understaffed district courts. A district judge’s
attention cannot focus primarily on legal questions but must also be
devoted to other important duties like managing the case, overseeing
discovery, and facilitating settlement.47 District courts are not collegial
courts, so legal rulings are made without the benefit of other judges
who may have different perspectives, offer new arguments, or point out
weaknesses in tentative positions.48 District judges generally have
fewer law clerks than appellate judges.49 The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, which govern practice in the district courts, do not even
expressly provide for amicus briefs, though they are filed on rare
occasions.50 Most district judges are highly competent, but shortcuts
and errors are to be expected. Consider the recent remarks of District
Judge Jed Rakoff, who is nobody’s idea of a slouch:
[A] district judge doesn’t have the luxury to treat every case and every
issue with the total attention it might theoretically deserve. District
judges’ busy dockets demand they get on with the job, and that often
requires arriving at a tentative “common sense” solution to the
underlying dispute presented by a case before they have had a chance
to fully plumb every legal nicety.51

The statutory-interpretive consequences of the resource disparities just
described will be fleshed out below, but the short of it is that
constrained decision-making environments can be expected to lead to
simpler and quicker interpretive approaches.
b. Differences in Docket Composition. Courts at different levels
of the system confront different kinds of cases and issues.
Difficulty of cases. To start with, the legal questions addressed by
the Supreme Court are typically harder than the legal questions

47. See Salve Regina Coll. v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 231–32 (1991).
48. See id. at 232 (observing that courts of appeals, unlike district courts, “employ multijudge
panels . . . that permit reflective dialogue and collective judgment”).
49. See LEE EPSTEIN, WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE BEHAVIOR OF
FEDERAL JUDGES: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RATIONAL CHOICE 235 (2013);
REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 66
(Sept. 1991).
50. E.g., Jin v. Ministry of State Sec., 557 F. Supp. 2d 131, 136–37 (D.D.C. 2008).
51. Joel Cohen, Richard A. Posner & Jed S. Rakoff, Should a Judge Rely on the Law or His
Own Common Sense?, SLATE (Sept. 18, 2017, 11:04 AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/
news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2017/09/should_a_judge_rely_on_the_law_or_his_own_commo
n_sense.html [https://perma.cc/P3LZ-TWTV].
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answered by the lower courts.52 Harder, for these purposes, means that
the most authoritative legal sources are underdeterminate. Cases
generally do not reach the Court when they are obviously resolved by
precedent or clear text.53 That means that the Court routinely needs to
bring to bear a variety of tools, or rely on debatable applications of
tools, in order to discern or construct statutory meaning. Because the
decisions are debatable, there are often separate opinions. A
concurrence or dissent might introduce countervailing tools or
canons—for example, a substantive canon or legislative history to
rebut a whole-code linguistic inference. As a result, a Supreme Court
opinion is often an elaborate confection featuring many tools
intensively used.
District courts certainly do difficult work, and lots of it, but hard
legal questions are unusual.54 Most of the legal questions they
encounter are settled by precedent or controlled by unambiguous text.
Even in the courts of appeals, where the easiest cases will never make
it, the vast majority of decisions are unpublished because the judges
regard them as making no contribution to the law.55 Most cases in the
district courts also have little ideological significance, which means
there is little reason to evade what appear to be straightforward
answers.56 The application of a state’s comparative negligence statute
to a car crash is less likely to stir up a judge’s personal political leanings
than a question about the intersection of antidiscrimination statutes
and religious freedoms. For these reasons, even if the lower courts had
time for exhaustive analysis and explanation in every case, which they
do not, there would often be no need for it.
Different mix of cases and legal issues. Different federal courts
encounter a different mix of topics and, within a given case, address
different kinds of issues. The following are a few such differences that

52. See EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 49, at 234–235.
53. Cf. Sup. Ct. R. 10 (listing conflict between lower courts as a reason for granting review).
54. See JON O. NEWMAN, BENCHED: ABORTION, TERRORISTS, DRONES, CROOKS,
SUPREME COURT, KENNEDY, NIXON, DEMI MOORE, AND OTHER TALES FROM THE LIFE OF A
FEDERAL JUDGE 251 (2017).
55. See JUDICIAL BUSINESS, supra note 42, tbl.B-12 (providing statistics on publication
rates).
56. See Herbert M. Kritzer, Robert A. Carp & Kenneth L. Manning, Polarization in
American Politics: Does it Extend to the Federal District Court? 23 (July 21, 2017) (unpublished
manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3007983 [https://perma.cc/9K4S-6DSG] (“It is on the trial
bench where we might expect that the legal model of judicial behavior—that is, the understanding
that judges’ decision-making is primarily driven by law, facts, and precedent rather than their own
personal policy preferences—would be most often manifested.”).
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are likely to generate some divergences in interpretive practices.
Unlike the differences above, which mostly affect the amount of canon
use, this category of differences affects which canons are needed most.
The modern U.S. Supreme Court almost never decides issues of
state law, but the lower federal courts routinely do so.57 On the civil
side of the docket, almost 30 percent of the district courts’ caseload is
made up of diversity cases.58 As a matter of interpretive theory, it is an
interesting question whether a federal court’s Erie-based duty to apply
state law entails a duty to use state interpretive tools and approaches.59
As a practical matter, however, the lower federal courts often apply
state “code construction acts,” state versions of familiar canons, and
even canons that do not have any direct federal analogue.60 The lower
courts’ diversity docket therefore provides a reason to suspect that
some tools will appear relatively more often in the lower courts, though
it is hard to predict which ones.
Some methodological divergence can be expected to arise from
the specialized or limited jurisdictions of certain lower courts. For
example, the Federal Circuit, which hears all veterans’ benefits
appeals, has a disproportionate opportunity to use the substantive
canon of construing statutes in favor of the veteran.61 District courts as
a class have less opportunity to apply agency-deference doctrines
because many cases reviewing agency action begin directly in the
courts of appeals, skipping the district courts entirely.62
Even within the same case, different courts tend to direct their
interpretive efforts toward different issues. District courts spend a
greater proportion of their time on jurisdiction, discovery, and other
57. The Supreme Court does hear cases that were originally filed in the district court under
diversity jurisdiction, but the modern Court hears those cases only in order to resolve matters of
federal law that arise along the way, e.g., Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S. 196, 198–
99 (1988), not to decide state-law issues.
58. JUDICIAL BUSINESS, supra note 42, tbl.C-4.
59. See generally Abbe R. Gluck, The Federal Common Law of Statutory Interpretation: Erie
for the Age of Statutes, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 753, 758, 782–84 (2013) (discussing this question).
60. E.g., Antonio v. SSA Sec., Inc., 749 F.3d 227, 237 (4th Cir. 2014) (applying Maryland’s
presumption against the implied repeal of common law); Gold v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 730 F.3d 137,
143–44 (2d Cir. 2013) (applying New York’s presumption against legislative retroactivity); Miller
v. LaSalle Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 595 F.3d 782, 786–87 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing various Indiana canons
of construction); Tex. Pharmacy Ass’n v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 105 F.3d 1035, 1039 (5th Cir.
1997) (applying the Texas Code Construction Act’s rule on severability of invalid statutory
provisions).
61. E.g., Nat’l Org. of Veterans’ Advocates, Inc. v. Sec’y of Veterans Affairs, 260 F.3d 1365,
1378 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
62. E.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2342 (2012) (certain orders of the FCC and several other agencies).
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procedural matters than the Supreme Court does.63 This is not to say
that the Supreme Court is uninterested in civil procedure or
jurisdiction—on the contrary, the Roberts Court has recently shown a
substantial interest64—but almost every case in the lower courts that
requires judicial action involves decisions on procedural, jurisdictional,
or evidentiary matters. The Supreme Court generally hears only one
question in a case, usually a question of substantive law, and the Court
is almost always free to disregard the procedural or evidentiary matters
that may have constituted much of the judicial activity below.
Limitations on federal appellate jurisdiction also cause systematic
differences in the issues that occupy different courts. For example,
there is little opportunity for appellate opinions on discovery because
discovery rulings are usually not immediately appealable, and, if and
when the time for appeal does come, those rulings often have become
moot or practically unimportant.65 Similarly, appellate courts have less
opportunity to address some categories of jurisdictional disputes
because decisions remanding removed cases to state court for lack of
federal jurisdiction are generally not appealable.66 This has an
important impact on the prevalence of interpretive canons across
courts because there is a substantive canon calling for the strict
construction of jurisdictional statutes, a canon invoked most often in
the context of the removal statute.67 District courts have far more
opportunities to apply this canon than appellate courts.
c. Role of Precedent. Precedent plays a different role in different
courts. Although the Supreme Court frequently cites various sorts of
precedents in its statutory-interpretive decisions,68 the Court is bound
only by its own decisions, and it is rare for the Court to exercise its
63. As compared to courts of appeals cases, the Supreme Court’s opinions are
underpopulated with words involving procedure and evidence. See Michael A. Livermore, Allen
B. Riddell & Daniel N. Rockmore, The Supreme Court and the Judicial Genre, 59 ARIZ. L. REV.
837, 872 (2017). One would expect the effect to be even stronger in the district courts. See
generally Elizabeth Y. McCuskey, Horizontal Procedure (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
author) (describing the preeminence of district courts in generating caselaw on matters of
procedure, especially on matters of discovery and case management).
64. See Howard M. Wasserman, The Roberts Court and the Civil Procedure Revival, 31 REV.
LITIG. 313, 313–14 (2012).
65. THOMAS A. MAUET & DAVID MARCUS, PRETRIAL § 6.1 at 195 (9th ed. 2015).
66. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d). But see 28 U.S.C. § 1453(c)(1) (making an exception for certain large
class actions).
67. See Bruhl, supra note 1, at 506–08.
68. See Nicholas S. Zeppos, The Use of Authority in Statutory Interpretation: An Empirical
Analysis, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1073, 1093 (1992).
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discretionary jurisdiction to hear a case that is squarely resolved by its
prior holdings.69 Precedent is much thicker and more constraining in
the lower courts, as not just Supreme Court precedents but also circuit
precedents are binding on the issuing circuit and its district courts.
Therefore, one often sees lower courts decide cases through the routine
application of local precedent even when the issue is so unsettled at the
national level that it later results in a Supreme Court decision. For
example, in McNeill v. United States,70 the Supreme Court resolved a
circuit split over the Armed Career Criminal Act by using plain
meaning, the whole-act rule, and the absurd-results doctrine.71 The
district court in the same case had written an unpublished opinion that
relied, for the relevant point, on an unpublished (and therefore
nonbinding) circuit decision.72 Similarly, the question that divided the
Supreme Court 5 to 4 in Dorsey v. United States,73 was considered so
settled that the district judge stated from the bench, “I have ruled on
this many times before so I won’t be spending a lot of time nor asking
[the prosecutor or defense attorney] to respond [to the ruling].”74 The
overwhelming importance of precedent in the lower courts today,
combined with the rarity of cases of first impression, has left all other
interpretive tools—for example, textual and substantive canons,
dictionaries, and legislative debates—with less of a role to play.
The nature of the hierarchical system also makes it more
important for the Supreme Court to get its few but highly
consequential decisions right. There is no further reviewing court to
correct the Court’s errors, and congressional overrides of Supreme
Court decisions are difficult and increasingly rare.75 The legal
interpretations of the district courts, by contrast, are highly provisional
69. The Court can of course overrule its precedents, but stare decisis has particular force in
statutory cases. Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2409 (2015).
70. McNeill v. United States, 563 U.S. 816 (2011).
71. Id. at 821–22.
72. United States v. McNeill, No. 5:08-CR-2-D-1 (E.D.N.C. Jan. 26, 2009), 2009 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 131062 at *13.
73. Dorsey v. United States, 567 U.S. 260 (2012).
74. Transcript of Sentencing Hearing, United States v. Dorsey, No. 09-20003 (C.D. Ill. Sept.
10, 2010), reprinted in Joint Appendix at *69, Dorsey v. United States, No. 11-5683 (Jan. 25, 2012),
2012 WL 608393.
75. There is disagreement over how to define overrides and when the decline started, but
there is agreement that overrides have sharply declined. See Richard L. Hasen, End of the
Dialogue? Political Polarization, the Supreme Court, and Congress, 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 205, 209,
218 (2013); Matthew R. Christiansen & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Congressional Overrides of
Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 1967–2011, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1317, 1332–33
(2014).
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and so, even if there were enough time to do so, it might not make sense
for the district courts to turn over every stone to find what looks like
the best decision in a close case. Still, it is bracing to see, in an official
publication of the Federal Judicial Center, newly appointed district
judges being given the following advice about how to approach cases
in which the law is unsettled or nonexistent:
Do not worry about whether you may be reversed. No judge has been
impeached for having been reversed. Get on with the opinion and do
the best you can. The court of appeals or the Supreme Court is going
to have the last word anyhow.76

The courts of appeals are indeed often the last word, but even
there one sometimes observes judges stating that they need not do their
all to get a case right. In particular, judges sometimes argue against
rehearing a case en banc, which would allow them to reexamine
questionable circuit precedent, because the issue is one that the
Supreme Court could be reasonably expected to resolve in the near
future anyway.77
d. Executive Advice. Another potentially relevant difference
across judicial tiers is that the Supreme Court gets more input from the
executive branch on how to decide cases. When the United States is
not a party to a Supreme Court case, the government often submits an
amicus brief, especially when the interpretation of a federal statute is
at issue.78 At a minimum, these briefs provide helpful information to
the Court. More than that, the briefs can present an administrative
agency’s official interpretation, not previously announced, that can
then warrant deference from the Court under the Skidmore79 and
Auer/Seminole Rock80 doctrines.81 Agency amicus briefs are rare in the
lower courts, especially in the district courts.82 The lower courts

76. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, BENCHBOOK FOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
JUDGES 209 (6th ed. 2013).
77. E.g., NEWMAN, supra note 54, at 165.
78. See Cordray & Cordray, supra note 39, at 1353–60 (describing the Solicitor General’s
amicus activity).
79. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139–40 (1944).
80. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997); Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S.
410, 414 (1945).
81. E.g., Auer, 519 U.S. at 461–62 (deferring to the interpretation of a regulation advanced
in the government’s amicus brief).
82. See, e.g., Dekeyser v. Thyssenkrupp Waupaca Inc., No. 08-C-488, 2009 WL 5214418, at
*1 (E.D. Wis. Dec. 28, 2009) (denying a party’s motion to invite an agency to submit a brief);
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therefore have fewer occasions to use the doctrines, so prevalent in the
Supreme Court, that govern deference to agency interpretations
presented in briefs.83
2. Ideological Differences. Judges have policy preferences, and
these preferences express themselves in statutory cases as in other
domains.84 The effects of judicial ideologies can be expected to play out
somewhat differently at different levels of the judicial system.
To begin with, Supreme Court cases are generally high stakes and
difficult—that is, least constrained by authoritative legal materials85—
so there is more motive and opportunity for ideology to operate at the
Supreme Court level. What this means for interpretive methods is not
entirely clear. It probably means that canons and other tools play less
of a role in determining outcomes than they do in lower courts, even if
the Court’s opinions make fulsome use of them. At the same time, it
could be that the public scrutiny trained on the Court makes the
Justices sensitive to charges of activism and could encourage them to
adopt at least a pose of restraint. The desire to avoid charges of
activism has been put forward as a potential explanation for the Court’s
unusually firm embrace of the purportedly neutral guidance offered by
dictionaries.86
In terms of the content of judicial preferences, it is possible for
different courts to fall at different places on the ideological spectrum.
This can have methodological consequences because some aspects of
the familiar left–right divide have predictable associations with views
about particular interpretive canons, such as conservatism being
associated with canons protecting sovereign immunity and disfavoring
extraterritorial application of federal law.87 We might, therefore,
Burgess v. Garvin, No. 01 CIV. 10994 (GEL), 2004 WL 527053, at *4 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 2004)
(noting that the government declined the court’s invitation to file an amicus brief).
83. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme
Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083,
1098–99, 1111–15 (2008) (documenting the role of government amicus briefs as sources of
interpretations in the Supreme Court).
84. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DAVID SCHKADE, LISA ELLMAN & ANDRES SAWICKI, ARE
JUDGES POLITICAL? AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 24–40 (2006)
(showing the effect of ideology in several statutory fields).
85. See supra Part I.B.1.b (describing differences in case difficulty across tiers of the
judiciary).
86. James J. Brudney & Lawrence Baum, Oasis or Mirage: The Supreme Court’s Thirst for
Dictionaries in the Rehnquist and Roberts Eras, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 483, 499–500 (2013).
87. For example, in EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991), Justice
Marshall’s dissent for the three most liberal Justices criticized the majority for strengthening the
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expect conservative-leaning courts to favor different canons than
liberal-leaning courts. To be sure, the ideological differences across
tiers could not be too large without leading to unsustainable conflict,
and a president generally appoints like-minded judges to all levels of
the judiciary. But there is some slack in the system due to factors like
home-state senators’ influence and lumpiness in the timing of
retirements and replacements across different courts.88
There are other preferences—not ideological in the familiar left–
right sense—that can be expected to vary systematically across courts.
These preferences include, notably, institutionally oriented
preferences about how the judicial system operates. For example, busy
lower-court judges might favor canons that restrict their jurisdiction.89
3. Lag Effects. The Supreme Court sometimes changes the rules
of statutory interpretation.90 Unless a change is instantly transmitted
through the rest of the system, there will be a lag that creates at least a
temporary divergence between different courts.
Consider the situation in which the Supreme Court stops using a
canon. If the Court expressly repudiates the canon, one would expect
the lower courts to catch on soon enough. If instead the Court simply
stops using a canon even when the canon seems applicable, a faithful
lower court might be unsure how to respond. Given uncertainty over
the Court’s reasons, and habit being a powerful force, the lower courts
might be expected to continue using canons that have largely
disappeared from the U.S. Reports. In prior work, I identified several
canons that appear to be in this state of limbo, abandoned by the

presumption against extraterritoriality. Id. at 261–62 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
88. See generally Lee Epstein, Andrew D. Martin, Jeffrey A. Segal & Chad Westerland, The
Judicial Common Space, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 303 (2007) (comparing ideology scores of the
Supreme Court and each federal court of appeals); Federal District Court Judge Ideology Data,
CHRISTINA L. BOYD (2015) http://clboyd.net/ideology.html [https://perma.cc/CRY4-Z5VK]
(providing similar data for district judges).
89. See Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, The Jurisdiction Canon, 70 VAND. L. REV. 499, 553–55
(2017).
90. See, e.g., Bruhl, supra note 1, at 494–546 (discussing how lower courts respond when the
Supreme Court changes the interpretive regime); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey,
Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV.
593, 611–29 (1992) (discussing the development of new canons in the Rehnquist Court); Nina A.
Mendelson, Change, Creation, and Unpredictability in Statutory Interpretation: Interpretive Canon
Use in the Roberts Court’s First Decade, 117 MICH. L. REV. at *36 (forthcoming 2018) (on file with
the Duke Law Journal); Adrian Vermeule, The Cycles of Statutory Interpretation, 68 U. CHI. L.
REV. 149, 149 (2001) (stating that “the Court has changed its practice, and sometimes the formally
stated rules, with remarkable frequency”).
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Supreme Court but soldiering on in the lower courts.91
In addition, it also turns out that certain canons have a natural
lifecycle. That is, canons become prominent at different levels of the
judicial system at different times. Think of a snake that swallows a
mouse. One can see the bulge start at the snake’s head and move slowly
tailward as the mouse is digested. One might observe something similar
when the Supreme Court creates a new interpretive canon. The canon
is first prominent in the Supreme Court itself. The Court’s use of the
canon then declines as the activity slides to the courts of appeals and
district courts, which digest the new development by working out its
details and applying it to various cases. Eventually, the canon ends up,
now fully absorbed into the system, in the lower courts’ routine
unpublished decisions.92
For the sake of clarity, the changes in the interpretive regime
under discussion here should be distinguished from the phenomenon
of individual statutes having their own interpretive lifecycles. A new
statute initially presents numerous questions of first impression.
Gradually, as the important questions are answered, precedent
becomes the dominant interpretive tool and many disputes merely
require application of settled law to particular facts.93 These statutelevel changes ordinarily would not cause regime-level shifts, though
such an effect is possible if, for instance, Congress stops passing a type
of legislation associated with a subject-specific substantive canon.94
C. Summary of Predictions and Key Questions
The foregoing pages discussed several potential drivers of
interpretive divergence. Admittedly, it is not always clear how a
particular feature of the lower courts should cash out in terms of
interpretive methodology. But we do know enough to form some
tentative predictions about what statutory interpretation in lower
91. Bruhl, supra note 1, at 521 (discussing canons involving civil rights, jurisdiction, and
Indian law).
92. See infra Part II.F (describing such a pattern in connection with federalism canons).
93. See James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, The Decline and Fall of Legislative History?
Patterns of Supreme Court Reliance in the Burger and Rehnquist Eras, 89 JUDICATURE 220, 224–
26 (2006) (presenting evidence of a link between statutory age and declining use of legislative
history for several statutes governing the workplace); David S. Law & David Zaring, Law Versus
Ideology: The Supreme Court and the Use of Legislative History, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1653,
1722–25 (2010) (showing that the Supreme Court’s use of legislative history generally declined
with statutory age, though usage increased again once a statute became very old).
94. See Bruhl, supra note 1 at 524–26 (tentatively proposing that the decline of the civil-rights
canon is partly explained by the aging of the leading civil-rights statutes).
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courts should look like and to identify key questions to investigate.
One overarching expectation is that hierarchical divergence must
stay within certain bounds. All federal courts are part of the same
appellate system. Whether or not the Supreme Court’s methodology is
binding as a formal matter, the Supreme Court’s pronouncements and
patterns of conduct are highly salient and likely to be practically
influential.95 Professional norms of craft and the natural desire to
advance one’s reputation mean that lower-court judges want to do (and
be seen as doing) good work.96 The Supreme Court’s style provides the
natural benchmark for such evaluation.97 So too, if the Supreme Court
or particularly vocal members of it announce that the interpretive
ground rules have changed and that textualism is the new philosophy,
then the lower courts can be expected to take notice and adjust their
own practices.
A key question, though, is how closely and quickly the lower
courts follow the Supreme Court’s lead. The analysis below will
provide several opportunities to test how much slack exists in the
system. Most notably, it will examine, in a study that spans several
decades and all three tiers of the federal judiciary, whether the
textualist renaissance of the 1980s and 1990s manifested itself in all
courts or only in the Supreme Court.98 And, zooming in on one specific
topic, it studies the spread of the Rehnquist Court’s “new federalism”
canons.99
One strong prediction—which is derived from the overlapping
influence of caseload pressures, lower average difficulty of cases, lower
average quality of briefing, and other factors—is that the lower courts’
interpretive practices should be simpler than the Supreme Court’s
practices. The district courts’ practices should be least complex of all.
Simplicity, in this context, is operating as a term of art that means a
couple of specific things. First, it means that fewer interpretive tools will
be used in a decision. More specifically, all tools for resolving cases of
first impression—such as textual analysis, legislative history, and
substantive canons—should be less prevalent as one moves down the
judicial hierarchy. Correspondingly, precedent should loom larger, the

95. See supra Part I.A.
96. See BAUM, supra note 28, at 53–54, 97–104 (noting judges’ concern about their standing
among legal audiences).
97. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
98. Infra Part II.E.
99. Infra Part II.F.
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lower the court. When precedent resolves a case, other sources need
not be discussed as a doctrinal matter, and unnecessary discussion of
them is a luxury that a busy court can little afford. Second, the lower
courts’ use of tools other than precedent should be skewed toward
simpler tools and away from more complicated tools. Tools are more
complex, for these purposes, to the extent that they require
consideration of more numerous, more voluminous, and more
ambiguous materials. People could reasonably debate whether a
certain tool is simple or complicated, but most would agree that wholeact interpretations—and even more so, whole-code strategies—are
more complicated than narrower word- or clause-bound strategies such
as those relying on dictionaries and syntax. It is unclear where
legislative history falls on the simplicity scale, but what is clear is that
within the category of legislative history there are variations in
complexity. Committee reports are generally more accessible and
understandable than floor debates that might be scattered throughout
hundreds of pages of the Congressional Record.
In addition to the general prediction of simplicity, one can expect
some substantive canons to be concentrated at either the top or the
bottom of the judiciary. For example, we should expect the lower
courts, especially the district courts, to deal more often with canons
regarding jurisdiction and procedure due to docket composition and
limited opportunity to appeal such issues.
For some interpretive tools, different factors push in different
directions, rendering the total predicted effect on prevalence
indeterminate. Such is the case, notably, with deference doctrines like
Chevron. On the one hand, the district courts could be eager to defer
to agencies because of their caseload-driven demand for decisionmaking shortcuts and the general lack of political salience in their
cases. On the other hand, opportunities to use some deference regimes
are limited in the lower courts: many suits challenging agency action
skip over the district courts altogether, and government amicus briefs
offering new authoritative interpretations are rare outside of the
Supreme Court.100 In any event, it is valuable to investigate differences
in the use of important interpretive tools like these even without clear
hypotheses in mind.
Another prediction is that the differences between Supreme Court
opinions and lower-court opinions should be starkest in the lower

100. Supra text accompanying notes 50 and 82.
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courts’ unpublished opinions. In the courts of appeals, only about 15
percent of opinions are designated for publication. Judges designate
opinions as unpublished when they believe that they break no new
ground and would not usefully contribute to the body of precedent.101
Published and unpublished opinions look very different. Unpublished
decisions mostly apply settled precedent, often in a cursory way. They
tend not to include much original interpretative work at all. Often, the
two kinds of opinions are generated through different decisional
pathways. Unpublished opinions usually result from cases that did not
get oral argument, and they are sometimes drafted by central staff
attorneys.102 Unless the courts’ publication standards are meaningless
or routinely ignored, one should expect systematic divergences
between the interpretation-related features of published and
unpublished decisions. In particular, it is reasonable to expect that all
interpretive tools, apart from precedent, are particularly sparse in
unpublished decisions. A likely exception to this generalization is the
rule of lenity, which applies to the construction of criminal statutes.
There are many very weak appeals by criminal defendants, including
appeals in which the defendant acknowledges that the arguments are
foreclosed by precedent.103 Given the abundance of hopeless criminal
appeals, it would not be surprising to see lenity appear often in
unpublished appellate decisions, if only to reject the defendants’ lenitybased pleas.
In the district courts, too, most opinions are not published in
West’s official reporters.104 Those few district-court opinions that are
published are selected because, in the estimation of the judge or West’s
attorneys, the decision is important or novel enough to be of general
interest to the profession.105 So here too there should be systematic
101. See, e.g., In re Viola, 583 F. App’x 669, 669 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014); 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.1.
Publication rates are available in the Administrative Office’s annual Judicial Business reports at
tables B-12 or S-3, depending on the year. See JUDICIAL BUSINESS, supra note 42. The publication
rates vary over time, but 15 percent is a rough average for the last decade. Reports going back
two decades are available at http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/analysis-reports/judicialbusiness-united-states-courts [http://perma.cc/X6P9-AE7W]. The traditional label of “published”
is a bit misleading today, as even unpublished decisions are widely available. The real difference
is that only published appellate opinions are binding precedent. E.g., 7TH CIR. R. 32.1(b); see
GARNER ET AL., supra note 41, at 142.
102. See supra note 42.
103. E.g., United States v. Presas, 45 F. App’x 321, 321 (5th Cir. 2002).
104. See infra note 166 (describing the publication process in district courts).
105. See Ellen Platt, Unpublished vs. Unreported: What’s the Difference?, 5 PERSPECTIVES:
TEACHING LEGAL RESEARCH AND WRITING 26, 27 (1996); Submission Guidelines for Court
Opinions, THOMSON REUTERS, http://legalsolutions.thomsonreuters.com/law-products/practice/
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variations, with the rather rare published opinions being more likely to
feature extensive statutory-interpretive analysis than the more
numerous and routine unpublished ones.
II. RESEARCH METHODS AND FINDINGS
With some key questions and predictions now in hand, this Part of
the Article examines the interpretive practices of lower courts,
especially the federal district courts, and compares them to the
practices of the Supreme Court. There is no established protocol or
single right approach to studying interpretive methodology. The best
way to derive robust conclusions is to use multiple methods, search
strategies, and comparisons. If different approaches yield similar
results, that corroboration justifies greater confidence in the findings.
It is also important to be transparent about one’s methods and, where
possible, to externally validate one’s measures.
In an effort to achieve the desired robustness, this Article uses
several distinct methods. One method studies a period of 40 years to
track the changing use of several interpretive tools that figure
prominently in the battle between textualism and opposing
philosophies: legislative history, linguistic canons, dictionaries, and
holistic-textual canons. Another portion of the analysis considers more
than 20 canons over the period of a decade and identifies the
interpretive tools that are most overrepresented and underrepresented
in the lower courts as compared to the Supreme Court. Another
approach is the matched-corpus method, in which the same cases are
examined at all three levels of the federal judicial system. This method
shows whether interpretive differences persist once one controls for
the biasing effect of the Supreme Court’s case-selection process. That
is, the matched-corpus method reveals whether the lower courts and
the Supreme Court are doing the same things differently as well as doing
different things. Finally, there is a case study showing how one of the
Rehnquist Court’s state-sovereignty canons moved through different
levels of the judicial system and different kinds of opinions.
To preview briefly, the findings from the different methods are
consistent where they overlap and mostly support the hypotheses
developed in Part I. The lower courts use fewer interpretive tools
overall, and they especially avoid the most complex tools. This is true
even in cases that eventually reach the Supreme Court. In addition, the

government/custom-publish-guidelines [https://perma.cc/VR2X-NLUB].
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lower courts’ interpretive practices tend to reflect, though in a rather
loose way, the shifting trends in the Supreme Court’s methods. In
particular, the lower courts engaged in a textualist shift similar to the
Supreme Court’s, but it was lesser in magnitude.
Before presenting the different analyses and results, it is
appropriate to provide some details regarding this study’s
methodology. Readers who are eager to see the results are welcome to
skip ahead to Part II.C.
A. Ways in Which Interpretation Can Differ Across Courts
There are several ways that interpretive methods could vary across
different courts. These include differences in doctrinal formulations of
the governing rules and differences in case outcomes. Most of the
analyses in this Article focus instead on variations in the frequency with
which various canons and tools are used in different courts. It is
therefore important to briefly describe the ways that interpretive
methods could vary across courts and to explain why measuring canon
frequency, rather than other forms of interpretive divergence, is an
especially attractive strategy for studying cross-court differences.
One kind of cross-court divergence in interpretive approaches is
doctrinal divergence. For example, courts might disagree over whether
legislative history is ever a permissible input or over whether a statute
is governed by a substantive canon. When the Supreme Court has been
clear and consistent, such disputes should be rare even in a world of
only semiprecedential methodology. The rarity of sharp doctrinal
conflicts limits their usefulness as a tool for studying cross-court
differences. A more mundane form of doctrinal divergence is
disagreement over how exactly to formulate an acknowledged
interpretive canon or how much force to give it—for example, whether
to describe a rule disfavoring extraterritorial application of U.S. law as
a mere presumption or as a clear-statement rule.106 The difficulty in
studying these sorts of divergences is that courts may not always be
fully aware of such nuances and therefore might slip back and forth
between different formulations.
A second way to understand interpretive divergence across the
hierarchy of courts is to measure whether different courts tend to reach
different interpretive outcomes. That is, if one court regularly
106. Cf. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 263 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(criticizing the majority for changing a mere presumption against extraterritorial application into
a clear-statement rule).
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interprets criminal statutes to reach more conduct than another court,
other explanations having been ruled out, then that court shows less
“lenity in fact,” even if both courts say the same thing, or nothing at all,
about the rule of lenity. Similarly, one could study whether different
courts are more or less likely to defer to agency interpretations.107 A
difficulty in studying statutory interpretation through case outcomes
lies in controlling for other variables that influence outcomes at the
case level or court level. Docket composition and ideological factors
would need to be considered, for example. Likewise relevant, but much
harder to measure and quantify, are many other outcome-relevant
features of a given case.
Interpretive tools are especially difficult targets for outcomeoriented study. For one thing, the invocation of a particular tool may
appear to cause a particular outcome, but the causal relationship might
actually run in the opposite direction. That is, it could be that judges
are choosing outcomes and then selecting (or instructing the clerks to
select) the tools that explain or justify them. Even setting that risk
aside, the nature of the canons is that they merely contribute to the
determination of legal meaning. They are not rigid, case-determinative
rules. As Judge Easterbrook put it, writing in a particularly canonskeptical tone, “every canon implicitly begins or ends with the
statement ‘unless the context indicates otherwise,’ which potentially
leaves so much room for maneuver that the canon isn’t doing much
work.”108 As even the canons’ staunchest advocates concede, different
canons need to be synthesized and reconciled through the use of sound
professional judgment.109 Further, the triggering conditions for many
canons and tools are vague, such as a requirement that the text be
“ambiguous.”110 Ambiguity is a troublesome trigger because there is no
agreement on how clear a text must be in order to count as
unambiguous. And even if different judges agreed that the threshold
clarity should be, say, 65 percent clear, they might still disagree over

107. E.g., Kent Barnett & Christopher J. Walker, Chevron in the Circuit Courts, 116 MICH. L.
REV. 1, 28–32, 43 (2017); Kristin E. Hickman & Matthew D. Krueger, In Search of the Modern
Skidmore Standard, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1235, 1238, 1271, 1280 (2007); Richard J. Pierce, Jr. &
Joshua Weiss, An Empirical Study of Judicial Review of Agency Interpretations of Agency Rules,
63 ADMIN. L. REV. 515, 519 (2011).
108. Easterbrook, supra note 23, at 83.
109. See ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION
OF LEGAL TEXTS 51, 59–62 (2012).
110. See Kavanaugh, supra note 31, at 2135–36 (listing legislative history, the avoidance
canon, and Chevron as examples of tools only triggered by a finding of ambiguity).
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whether a particular text reaches that mark.111 Even in the formalist’s
heaven, then, there would be only slight associations between the use
of a particular interpretive tool and case outcomes.
Rather than studying interpretive divergence through doctrinal
differences or case outcomes, this Article largely focuses on a third way
that courts might diverge, one that considers doctrine but studies it in
a quantitative way. In particular, this Article focuses on the frequency
with which different courts use various interpretive canons and
sources.112 This measure is important and tractable. To a significant
degree, the observable difference between competing interpretive
approaches lies in which tools they prioritize and emphasize.113 A judge
that uses linguistic canons and dictionaries extensively but uses
legislative history sparingly is more textualist than a judge who displays
the opposite tendencies. The choice of tools gives concrete expression
to differences in interpretive philosophy. Happily, the invocation of
interpretive tools in an opinion is easier to measure than the underlying
philosophies in the abstract.
Further, although one cannot draw a straight line from particular
canons to case outcomes, that does not mean that canons have no effect
on outcomes. They narrow the possibilities. They make certain
decisional pathways easier to follow and explain.114 Especially in the
lower courts—and in the district courts most of all—where caseloads
are high and ideological stakes are usually low, canons and other
legalistic tools probably exert significant influence on decisions.115
Finally, even if canons have nothing to do with generating
outcomes, the invocation of certain canons over others is still
111. Id. at 2135–38.
112. Cf. Anita S. Krishnakumar & Victoria F. Nourse, The Canon Wars, 97 TEX. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 19) (citing frequency of use as one factor that determines
whether
an
interpretive
practice
is
a
valid
canon
of
interpretation),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=3141356 [https://perma.cc/U4AU-XXVF].
113. See Czarnezki & Ford, supra note 34, at 860–61 (identifying interpretive philosophies
based on which tools a judge uses).
114. Cf. Mark J. Richards & Herbert M. Kritzer, Jurisprudential Regimes in Supreme Court
Decision Making, 96 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 305, 305–06, 308–10 (2002) (describing “jurisprudential
regimes”—the frameworks that structure and influence judicial decision-making by mediating
between case facts and outcomes).
115. See EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 49, at 9–11 (explaining that ideology matters more and
legal considerations matter less as one moves up the judiciary); see also Brian Sheppard, Judging
Under Pressure: A Behavioral Examination of the Relationship Between Legal Decisionmaking
and Time, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 931, 980 (2012) (providing experimental evidence that reducing
the time available for decision-making increases the likelihood that decisionmakers will obey
legal constraints).
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meaningful because it reveals the court’s interpretive language—the
way the court explains its decisions and seeks to persuade judges and
attorneys of their correctness.116 If courts speak different languages,
then the attorneys arguing before them need to speak the right
language to the right court.
B. Overview of Research Methods
Several methodological matters about how to study canon
frequency require brief comment.
1. Identifying Cases that Use Canons. As explained above, this
Article studies interpretive approaches by examining how often courts
use canons. This is done differently in different parts of the Article,
depending on the goal at issue and the number of cases involved. For
the matched-corpus analysis in Section II.D, which involves only a
couple of hundred cases at each level of the judiciary, I used
intentionally overinclusive search terms to identify potential hits and
then read the material around the terms to decide whether a particular
canon or source was being used to interpret a statute. For example, a
search might use the word “hearing,” and then the search results would
be reviewed to identify the cases that actually involve the use of a
legislative hearing in connection with statutory interpretation.
The analysis in other parts of this Article covers one or more
decades and many thousands of cases, making human reading
impractical. To get a sense of scale, consider that the search strategy
described in the next section identified over 100,000 unpublished
district-court decisions over the last decade that involved statutory
interpretation. Reading even a meaningful sample of those decisions
would be impractical. Therefore, apart from the manageably sized
matched-corpus study in Section II.D, the analyses in this Article rely
on electronic searches, primarily in Westlaw, to identify and count
cases. This means that search terms had to be carefully selected to
reduce the incidence of false positives and false negatives. Here are two
examples of search strings used in this study:
For linguistic canons:
adv: OP(((expressio or expresio or inclusio or “last antecedent” or
116. See Bruhl, supra note 1, at 505; Jane S. Schacter, The Confounding Common Law
Originalism in Recent Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation: Implications for the Legislative
History Debate and Beyond, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1, 13 (1998).
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“noscitur a sociis” or “ejusdem generis”) /50 (statut! or act or legislat!
or congress! or U.S.C.)) or ((expressio or expresio or inclusio or “last
antecedent” or “noscitur a sociis” or “ejusdem generis”) /p (statut! or
act or legislat! or congress! or U.S.C.))) and DA([year])

For Congressional Record:
adv: OP(“Cong.Rec.” or “Cong. Rec.” or “Congressional Record”)
and OP((statut! or legislat! or congress! or U.S.C.) /s (interpret! or
constru! or meaning or reading)) and DA([year])117

Each of these search strings begins with the tool or tools at issue,
including variant spellings and citation forms. The search string then
adds a qualification meant to restrict the results to cases involving the
interpretation of statutes rather than other texts, though admittedly
with the result of excluding some statutory cases too. This restriction
was important because linguistic canons and some other tools are used
in contracts and insurance cases to interpret nonstatutory texts, and
these cases arise frequently in the lower courts due to diversity
jurisdiction. Some trial-and-error pilot testing helped to identify good
search strings, that is, those that neither err too far toward false
positives nor toward false negatives.118 Other search strings would
generate somewhat different results, but that is acceptable for at least
two reasons. First, the goal is to make cross-court comparisons in the
use of canons, not to determine the precise levels of canon use in an
absolute sense. Second, using different strategies in combination—
such as these large-n electronic searches plus the individualized manual
scrutiny applied in the matched-corpus analysis—justifies confidence
in the robustness of repeated similar results.
Using electronic search strings in a large-n study restricts the range
of interpretive tools that can be reliably studied. Fortunately, many
interpretive tools are closely associated with particular names, phrases,
or standard citation forms that make them easy to identify (for
example, ejusdem generis and S. Rep./S. Rpt. or the words “Senate,”
“committee,” and “report” in close proximity). Other tools cannot be
identified so reliably and thus require human intervention. The use of
the common law as an interpretive tool is an example of the latter,
117. The “adv” prefix instructs Westlaw to conduct a “terms and connectors” search rather
than use the fuzzier search algorithms employed by default in the new WestlawNext system. The
“OP” field limits the search to the opinions, excluding the West-created material in synopses, Key
Numbers, and headnotes, all of which could introduce artificial cross-court and cross-period
variation.
118. The search terms used for each tool are on file with the Duke Law Journal.
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because there are many other reasons for “common law” to appear
near references to statutes. As a result, some tools are included in the
matched-corpus analysis but not elsewhere.
The methodology used in this Article does not involve any
judgment about whether a canon was the primary determinant of the
court’s decision or how much reliance the court placed on the source.
Such judgments produce useful information, but they also introduce
more subjectivity and make it difficult to analyze large numbers of
cases. Further, “negative” uses of a canon—such as statements that a
particular canon is unpersuasive or inapplicable to a case—are
included in the results. That choice is sensible as a matter of
interpretive theory because even those kinds of uses of a canon or
source show that the tool is a recognized part of the court’s interpretive
vocabulary. If a particular canon were not cited by attorneys and at
least conceivably usable as judicial authority, there would be no need
for the court to justify not applying it in a given case.119 Including
negative citations is also a practical necessity for the large-n portions
of the analysis. Finally, for purposes of this study, canons count if they
appear in any opinion in a case, not just majority opinions.
2. Selecting a Denominator. Some parts of this analysis calculate
citation rates and compare them across courts. Calculating a rate
requires a denominator by which to divide the raw numbers of
citations. Deriving an appropriate denominator takes some thought.
Using the number of cases filed each year is too crude, as many districtcourt cases are resolved through early settlements or guilty pleas
without any judicial opinions. At the other extreme, a few district-court
cases generate multiple published opinions at various stages of the
litigation. The number of written decisions would therefore be a better
denominator, but that denominator would also be inadequate because
many written decisions in the lower courts do not address statutory
interpretation but instead concern factual issues, discretionary casemanagement matters, state common law, and so on.
I used a denominator that is meant to capture cases that
meaningfully engage with statutory interpretation, as determinable
through a Westlaw search string.120 Different search terms would
119. See Mendelson, supra note 90, at *24–25 (arguing that “questions of a canon’s
applicability are often difficult ones,” so when a court discusses but does not apply a canon, that
discussion still clarifies the function of the canon in general).
120. The Westlaw search string I used to generate the denominator is adv: OP((statut! or
legislat! or congress! or U.S.C.) /s (interpret! or constru! or meaning or reading)) and DA([year]).
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generate different denominators and thus different rates, of course, so
it would be a mistake to make precise claims about what percentage of
cases use various tools. The aim is instead to provide a measure that
facilitates comparisons across the judicial hierarchy by roughly
adjusting for varying caseloads across courts and over time. The
denominator used in this study meets those aims.
To provide an external check on the validity of this denominator,
I compared my denominator to the number of cases in the Spaeth
Supreme Court Database in which the primary or secondary legal
authorities were coded as statutory.121 The two figures are not
measuring exactly the same concept, but the two data series showed
the same rising, falling, and leveling-off patterns over the period from
1975 to 2014, and they yielded a reassuringly high correlation
coefficient of 0.86 (p < 0.001). That provides confidence that the
denominator used here is a good measure for the Supreme Court and,
by extension, for other courts as well.122
I should note that some parts of this analysis do not rely on citation
rates and therefore do not require a denominator. Again, the goal is to
use multiple methods and to repose the most confidence in mutually
reinforcing results.
3. Sources and Databases. Different data sources were used to
collect cases for different parts of this Article. For the matched-corpus
study in Section II.D, it was important to attempt to locate a districtcourt opinion for every Supreme Court case in the corpus. To secure
these opinions, it was necessary to search Westlaw, Lexis, docket
121. To be precise, these are the Spaeth Supreme Court Database cases in which the variables
authorityDecision1 or authorityDecision2 were coded as 4. For another source that uses the
Database to calculate a denominator in this way, see Nicholas R. Parrillo, Leviathan and
Interpretive Revolution: The Administrative State, the Judiciary, and the Rise of Legislative History,
1890–1950, 123 YALE L.J. 266, 366 n.346 (2013). The figure derived from the Database is not
measuring exactly the same thing as my denominator, because the former includes cases
interpreting federal treaties and court rules, and because it is oriented toward the nature of the
source at issue rather than the activity undertaken. See HAROLD SPAETH, LEE EPSTEIN, TED
RUGER, SARAH C. BENESH, JEFFREY SEGAL & ANDREW D. MARTIN, SUPREME COURT
DATABASE CODE BOOK
55
(2017),
http://scdb.wustl.edu/documentation.php?s=2
[https://perma.cc/N3MC-XJZG].
122. If there were a generally accepted measure for how many lower-court cases engage in
statutory interpretation, I would use that, but no such measure has been widely agreed upon.
There are government statistics that track filings and appeals by subject—for example, diversity
cases, employment discrimination, and criminal sentencing—but the fact that a case is based on a
statutory claim does not mean that the case involves the work of statutory interpretation. The
resolution of a statutory claim could, for example, instead involve the assessment of the
sufficiency of the evidence or the exercise of sentencing discretion.
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sheets, and other sources.123 For the time trends and other portions of
the analysis, which involved searches over one or more decades and
tens of thousands of cases, Westlaw was the main source. For purposes
of this research, Westlaw appears to be more accurate than its
competitor Lexis.124
4. Published vs. Unpublished Opinions. As noted above, the large
majority of decisions of the courts of appeals and district courts are not
formally published.125 The opinions that are published are not remotely
a random sample of all opinions.126 On the contrary, they are
specifically selected for publication because they are significant.
Therefore, to achieve an understanding of how the judicial system
actually works, and how judges actually engage in statutory
interpretation, one needs to consider the large body of unpublished
opinions as well as the smaller group of published opinions.
Fortunately, even many unpublished decisions are now accessible
through one source or another. Although some unpublished districtcourt opinions still linger in relative obscurity on docket sheets,127 the
123. See infra text accompanying notes 159–63 (describing the sources employed in the
matched-corpus study).
124. The two services’ databases are not coextensive, and their search algorithms operate a
bit differently, so using Lexis would yield very similar but not identical results. One reason that
Westlaw is better for this study is that searching the “opinion” segment in Lexis excludes the
opinion’s footnotes, so the Lexis searches fail to find cases in which the search terms occur only
in the footnotes. For other studies of district courts that have favored Westlaw, see Elizabeth Y.
McCuskey, Clarity and Clarification: Grable Federal Questions in the Eyes of Their Beholders, 91
NEB. L. REV. 387, 424 (2012); and David A. Hoffman, Alan J. Izenman & Jeffrey R. Lidicker,
Docketology, District Courts, and Doctrine, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 681, 710 & n.138 (2007). One
quirk of Westlaw’s district-court database is that it includes decisions from the Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation and from the Customs Court. Those decisions were removed from the
results.
125. See supra text accompanying notes 101–05.
126. See Pauline T. Kim, Margo Schlanger, Christina L. Boyd & Andrew D. Martin, How
Should We Study District Judge Decision-Making?, 29 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 83, 96–98 (2009)
(“[A]uthoring judges decide whether to designate a particular opinion for publication, and their
decision to do so may depend upon formal rules, court culture, personal predilections, or strategic
considerations.”); Hillel Y. Levin, Making the Law: Unpublication in the District Courts, 53 VILL.
L. REV. 973, 988–89 (2008) (“[T]he published opinions are considered to be the ‘interesting’ and
‘important’ opinions, in the words of West’s publication guide . . . .”). It is also true that written
opinions, whether published or unpublished, do not represent all district-court action, much of
which happens in oral rulings or one-line orders. See Kim et al., supra, at 98–101. However, in
order to study judicial methods of statutory interpretation, one needs reasoned opinions of some
sort, whether published, unpublished, or in the form of a reasoned ruling from the bench.
127. See Elizabeth Y. McCuskey, Submerged Precedent, 16 NEVADA L.J. 515, 517 (2016)
(identifying a set of precedent even more submerged than unpublished decisions: the “mass of
reasoned opinions—putative precedent and not mere evidence of decision-making—that exist
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Westlaw and Lexis databases are dramatically more comprehensive
today than they used to be. For example, the number of unpublished
district-court opinions on Westlaw that meet my denominator filter has
increased more than tenfold from 1990 to the present, growing from
about 1100 per year to about 12,000. For a point of comparison, the
denominator for published district-court opinions has remained
relatively stable at 1800 to 2400 per year. Most of this jump in
unpublished opinions is attributable to broader availability on Westlaw
and Lexis, not to busier courts.128
Most of the analyses in this Article considered all published
opinions as well as those unpublished opinions that are available
through Westlaw. The matched-corpus analysis goes further; in an
effort to gather lower-court opinions that correspond to every included
Supreme Court case, it was sometimes necessary to search docket
sheets and other sources. Nevertheless, the results reported here do not
always display all categories of opinions. The unpublished opinions of
the courts of appeals almost never include significant interpretive
content.129 That fact is important in its own right, but most of the
analysis below omits detailed reporting of unpublished appellate
opinions because there is little to report.
C. Top-Heavy and Bottom-Heavy Canons
A good place to begin the comparison of interpretive methods is
to examine whether different courts tend to use different interpretive
tools. This first inquiry is important because it may reveal that the
Supreme Court’s interpretive practices are quite different from those
of the lower courts, which decide most of the cases and in which most
litigators practice. Recall that two of the hypotheses developed above
were that lower courts would both use fewer tools and emphasize less
complicated tools. Are those suppositions correct?

only on dockets.”); Peter W. Martin, District Court Opinions that Remain Hidden Despite a
Longstanding Congressional Mandate of Transparency—The Result of Judicial Autonomy and
Systemic Indifference, at *3 (Jan. 12, 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3034399
[https://perma.cc/N2WM-W6F8] (“Large numbers [of district-court decisions] remain hidden
from lawyers, academics, and the general public.”).
128. The number of unpublished district-court cases in the denominator exploded around
2005, which likely reflects either a change in the companies’ collection processes or the impact of
the E-Government Act of 2002, which mandates that courts make more decisions publicly
available. Pub. L. No. 107-347, § 205, 116 Stat. 2899 (2002).
129. See infra Part II.D.
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This Section approaches those hypotheses by providing data on
cross-tier differences in the use of around 20 tools of interpretation.
This analysis uses both citation rates and ratios. Citation rates reflect
the number of times a tool is cited, divided by the denominator of cases
that meaningfully engage with statutory interpretation.130 Citation
ratios require a bit more explanation. If a canon appeared in 5000
district-court decisions and 50 Supreme Court decisions, the canon
would have a 100:1 ratio. Suppose a different canon had a 10:1 ratio;
that is, it appeared only 10 times in the district courts for every 1
appearance in the Supreme Court. The canon with the 10:1 ratio would
be top-heavy in the sense that its use is skewed toward the Supreme
Court relative to the 100:1 canon, which, in turn, is bottom-heavy.
Notably, conclusions about relative top- and bottom-heaviness do not
require an agreed-upon denominator; nor do these conclusions require
the calculation of a neutral ratio that would reflect that all courts had
acted the same.
The analysis in this section covers the decade spanning from 2005
to 2014, which roughly corresponds to the first decade of the Roberts
Court.131 The analysis relies on Westlaw searches to identify cases from
each of the three levels of the federal judiciary that used various
interpretive canons or sources.132 Most of the tools in the figures below
should be familiar,133 but a few notes are in order: The entry for “whole
act” encompasses searches for the presumption of consistent usage, the
presumption of meaningful variation, and the in pari materia canon.
For legislative history, the searches covered three important sources—
committee reports (including conference committee reports), material
from the Congressional Record, and committee hearings—along with
a combined category for all three. “Defer to brief” refers to cases in
which the court defers to an agency interpretation provided in the
government’s brief.134 In addition, and as explained in greater detail
below, the searches included multiple formulations of the rule of

130. See supra Parts II.B.1–2 (describing how these measures are derived).
131. Chief Justice Roberts began his service on the Supreme Court in September 2005.
132. These Westlaw search strings are on file with the author and are available upon request.
133. For the benefit of readers who may not recognize some of the canons or sources listed in
the figures, good reference works providing definitions and examples are WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE,
JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY, ELIZABETH GARRETT & JAMES J. BRUDNEY, CASES AND MATERIALS
ON LEGISLATION AND REGULATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY app. B
(5th ed. 2014); and WILLIAM D. POPKIN, A DICTIONARY OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
(2007).
134. See supra text accompanying note 83.
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lenity.135
Figure 1 presents the citation rates. The interpretive tools are
arranged left to right from lowest to highest citation rate in
unpublished district-court opinions. The results in Figure 1 should not
be used to draw precise conclusions about the prevalence of various
canons, as the reported citation rates are sensitive to the phrasing of
the search terms and how one chooses to group canons together.136
Rather, the point is to make cross-court comparisons within each
canon. In that regard, one immediately sees that almost all the tools
appear most often in Supreme Court opinions. Indeed, most tools
display a stair-step pattern with usage rates lowest in unpublished
district-court opinions and then increasing from there. That pattern is
consistent with the hypothesis of hierarchically increasing interpretive
complexity.
There are some interesting exceptions to the pattern of stair-step
increases in citation rates within each source. One notable exception is
Chevron, for which the courts of appeals, rather than the Supreme
Court, are the leading users. Another is the canon of narrowly
construing statutes conferring federal jurisdiction,137 at the far right of
the figure, which displays an inverted pattern in which it appears most
often in unpublished district-court decisions and least often in
appellate courts.

135. Infra Part II.C.1.
136. Mendelson’s study of the Roberts-era Supreme Court uses roughly similar methods over
a similar time period but covers different canons and defines and groups the canons differently.
As a result, our citation rates for the Supreme Court are not directly comparable. Nonetheless,
for most of the canons that are covered in both studies and defined similarly, the results are
similar. See Mendelson, supra note 90, at *63 app. The biggest difference concerns expressio unius,
which Mendelson finds at a high rate of about 18 percent. Id. In my study, it appears in only a few
percent of the cases, and it is grouped with several other linguistic canons. The explanation is that
my search for this canon includes only the named canon itself, which is typically used in
conjunction with the core, list-focused form of the canon. Mendelson’s expressio unius canon
includes broader uses of the same idea, such as those involving contrasts between different
sections of a law or between different laws. Id. at *42. As the purpose of my study is to make
reliable cross-court comparisons, the precise percentage differences between canons are of
secondary importance.
137. E.g., Surface Am., Inc. v. United Sur. & Indem. Co., 867 F. Supp. 2d 282, 286 (D.P.R.
2012) (“As courts of limited jurisdiction, federal courts are bound to construe jurisdictional grants
narrowly.”). This canon is also described as a presumption against jurisdiction, especially removal
jurisdiction. See generally Bruhl, supra note 1, at 506–49 (describing this canon’s meaning, origins,
and justifications).
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Figure 1: Citation Rates for Selected Interpretive Tools, 2005–2014

Because the tools depicted above vary substantially in prevalence,
and because cross-canon differences are sensitive to differences in
search strategies, the ratio method is particularly well suited for our
task of studying cross-court differences in the relative importance of
different tools. Figure 2 below shows the citation ratios for various
canons in published opinions of the lower courts compared to the
Supreme Court. The canons are arranged according to the district
court–to–Supreme Court ratio, with relatively top-heavy, Supreme
Court–focused canons at the top of the chart and bottom-heavy canons
at the bottom. The presumption against preemption, which falls in the
middle of the pack, can be used to explain how to read the figure. For
every 1 Supreme Court case citing the presumption against
preemption, there are about 15 published district-court opinions citing
it and about 10 published court of appeals opinions citing it. For the
most part, the citation ratio for each canon is similar for the district
courts and courts of appeals, though several canons are significantly
more prominent at one level than the other. Chevron, for example, is
skewed toward the courts of appeals, and the jurisdiction canon is
heavily skewed toward the district courts.
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Figure 2: Citation Ratios for Selected Interpretive Tools, 2005–2014
(published opinions)

As noted, one can appreciate the relative top- and bottomheaviness of the listed canons without knowing the baseline neutral
ratio—that is, the ratio that would result if courts at each level had the
same propensities in their statutory-interpretation cases. To provide
some context, however, it might be useful to know that a rough
estimate of the neutral ratio for published opinions of the courts of
appeals and district courts is in the range of 35:1 or 40:1. That is because
there are approximately 35 or 40 times more published statutoryinterpretation cases both in the courts of appeals and in the district
courts over the last decade (about 16,500 cases and 22,000 cases
respectively) than there have been statutory-interpretation cases in the
Supreme Court (about 500).138 This ratio is represented by the vertical
gray bar across the figure. Judged by the neutral ratio, almost all
canons are overrepresented, on an absolute basis, at the Supreme
138. These figures represent the results of the denominator searches described in Part II.B.2.
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Court level.
The results in Figure 2 would differ somewhat if different search
strategies were used, so one should not place too much weight on fine
distinctions in ratios. Instead one should focus on the canons that show
particularly extreme results, especially where those results align with
other findings elsewhere in this Article. Easily the most bottom-heavy
canon in the district courts is the jurisdiction canon, the rule that
federal jurisdictional statutes are to be narrowly construed. Less
extreme, but also relatively overrepresented in the lower courts, are
Chevron, which is especially heavy in the courts of appeals;139 the oldfashioned formulation of the rule of lenity that calls for “strict
construction” of penal statutes;140 and a few traditional substantive
presumptions, particularly the canon disfavoring legislative
retroactivity. At the other extreme, the most top-heavy canon is the
“no elephants in mouseholes” rule, followed by deference to
government amicus briefs, the presumption against implied repeal,
congressional hearings and debates, constitutional avoidance, and the
whole-act presumptions.
The figure above reflects published decisions, but it is also
worthwhile to consider unpublished district-court decisions.
(Unpublished decisions from the courts of appeals almost never use
interpretive tools or canons,141 so they are not shown here.) As Figure
3 shows, the general patterns of relative top- and bottom-heaviness are
similar to those on display in the previous figure. For unpublished
district-court opinions, a reasonable neutral ratio is about 200:1,
because there are about 200 times more unpublished district-court
statutory-interpretation decisions from the last decade than there are
Supreme Court statutory-interpretation decisions. Every canon falls
short of the neutral ratio except for the jurisdiction canon, which
appears so often that it was necessary to use a logarithmic scale. The
relative prominence of the state-sovereignty canon in unpublished
opinions has an interesting story that is discussed further in Section
II.F; 25 years ago this canon behaved quite differently.

139. I conducted a circuit-by-circuit analysis for Chevron, and it showed, as one would expect,
that the D.C. Circuit is a particularly heavy user of the doctrine.
140. See infra Part II.C.1 (discussing different formulations of the rule of lenity).
141. See infra Part II.D.
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Figure 3: Citation Ratios for Selected Interpretive Tools, 2005–2014
(unpublished district-court opinions)

Several of the interpretive tools in Figures 1–3 merit additional
comment.
1. Rule of Lenity. The figures above present three entries for
different versions of the rule of lenity. For lenity and a few other
canons, multiple searches were conducted using language aimed at
capturing alternative formulations of the canon. Often the searches
included a narrower formulation to minimize false positives and a
broader formulation to minimize false negatives. For the rule of lenity,
one search simply looked for the phrase “rule of lenity.” Another
formulation, which reflects a traditional way of phrasing the canon,
provides that penal laws are to be strictly, or narrowly, construed.142
142. E.g., United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76, 95 (1820) (“The rule that penal
laws are to be construed strictly, is perhaps not much less old than construction itself.”); see also
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The third search, “lenity: all versions,” included both of the previous
forms.
The different search terms yielded interestingly different results
across courts. The traditional strict-construction phrasing suggests a
fairly robust rule that colors the court’s analysis from the start of every
case that involves the meaning of a criminal statute. The rule reminds
the court to be on the lookout for any lack of clarity in the criminal
prohibition. Some Supreme Court opinions arguably reject that
traditional strict-construction phrasing in favor of a weaker, last-resort,
tiebreaking canon.143 Perhaps as a result, the traditional strictconstruction formulation is less common today than other formulations
of the rule of lenity across all courts. But it is not equally uncommon.
It has almost disappeared in the Supreme Court, but it is relatively
more common in the lower courts, especially in the district courts.
Accordingly, that version of the canon is among the most bottomheavy canons, landing near the bottom of Figures 2 and 3.144
Figure 1 shows that the rule of lenity, in all of its forms, appears at
roughly the same rates in the published and unpublished decisions of
the district courts. This is a departure from the usual pattern in which
canons appear less often in unpublished opinions. Likewise, although
unpublished opinions from the courts of appeals are not shown in the
figures above, lenity is the rare canon that appears with any frequency
in those opinions. This finding aligns with the expectations laid out
earlier.145 The relatively high representation of the rule of lenity in
unpublished opinions likely reflects the fact that the calculus for
criminal defendants, many of whom have free representation, often
favors pursuing appeals even when the low odds of success would deter
Smith v. United States, 360 U.S. 1, 9 (1959) (referring to “the traditional canon of construction
which calls for the strict interpretation of criminal statutes”).
143. See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 239 (1993) (“The mere possibility of
articulating a narrower construction . . . does not by itself make the rule of lenity applicable.
Instead, that venerable rule is reserved for cases where, after seizing every thing from which aid
can be derived, the Court is left with an ambiguous statute.” (quotation marks, alterations, and
citations omitted)). Dissents, especially those by Justice Scalia, have more often used the strictconstruction formulation. Compare Abramski v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2259, 2281 (2014)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (using that formulation), with id. at 2272 n.10 (majority opinion). For a rare
modern example of the strict-construction formulation in a majority opinion, see United States v.
Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 266 (1997) (referring to “the canon of strict construction of criminal statutes,
or rule of lenity”).
144. The difference in phrasing does not necessarily indicate a systematic difference in the
rate at which criminal defendants win. Additional study would be required in order to determine
whether that is the case.
145. See supra text accompanying note 103.
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a paying litigant. A review of a small sample of these cases confirms
that the vast majority of the citations of lenity in these cases are
rejections of defendants’ invocations of the rule.
2. Varieties of Legislative History. Given its importance in debates
over interpretive methodology, legislative history merits separate
comment. Figure 2 shows that legislative history, as a combined
category, is neither especially top- nor bottom-heavy. When the
combined category is disaggregated into its constituent parts, however,
an interesting pattern emerges. Like the Supreme Court, lower courts
use committee reports more heavily than the other types of legislative
history.146 That makes sense given the conventional hierarchy of
legislative materials, which treats the reports of congressional
committees (both subject-matter committees and conference
committees) as the most valuable sources.147 But lower courts use the
other forms of legislative history under study—legislative hearings and
floor debate—much less frequently than the Supreme Court.
Table 1 below illustrates these cross-court disparities. The use of
congressional hearings declines especially steeply outside of the
Supreme Court. I suspect that the explanation for this pattern has a few
parts. First, congressional hearings have traditionally been relatively
inaccessible in the familiar legal databases.148 Second, attorneys may
not identify the more obscure pieces of legislative history, and lowercourt judges and their clerks have little time for independent research.

146. For studies of the Supreme Court showing that it uses committee reports more often than
the other forms of legislative history, see ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 133, at 786; Anita S.
Krishnakumar, Statutory Interpretation in the Roberts Court’s First Era: An Empirical and
Doctrinal Analysis, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 221, 237 (2010); Koby, infra note 190, at 387–90.
147. See Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 395–96 (1951) (Jackson,
J., concurring) (“Resort to legislative history is only justified where the face of the Act is
inescapably ambiguous, and then I think we should not go beyond Committee reports, which
presumably are well considered and carefully prepared.”); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR.,
INTERPRETING LAW: A PRIMER ON HOW TO READ STATUTES AND THE CONSTITUTION 239–40
(2016); ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES 18–20 (reprt. ed. 2014). A conference
committee’s explanatory statement is particularly valuable when a bill has changed substantially
since the committee stage. Victoria F. Nourse, A Decision Theory of Statutory Interpretation:
Legislative History by the Rules, 122 YALE L.J. 70, 109–11 (2012).
148. Lexis now has an extensive and highly searchable collection in the form of the
Congressional Hearings Digital Collection, but this development is only about a decade old. See
Status of Congressional Hearings Digital Collection Content Delivery, LEXISNEXIS,
https://www.lexisnexis.com/help/CU/new.htm [http://perma.cc/22YD-LNQW]. I suspect many
judges and attorneys are unfamiliar with the database. Westlaw has less useful coverage. See
Committee Hearings on Bill, Including Testimony by Witnesses, WESTLAW,
http://integrationsolutions.westlaw.com/aca/leghist/5.htm [https://perma.cc/RB4W-8ERM].
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Third, lower-court judges may not feel competent to piece together bits
of evidence spread throughout the enactment process in order to
achieve a complete understanding of the bill’s enactment history. All
of these factors push the lower courts toward extreme reliance on the
traditional hierarchy that puts committee reports at the top of the heap.
Table 1: Citation Rates (%) for Different Kinds of Legislative History,
by Court (2005–2014)
SCt

CtApp pub

DCt pub

DCt unpub

Cmte. reports 34.1

17.0

11.2

2.7

Cong. Record 14.7

5.9

3.7

0.7

Cong. hearings 11.4

1.7

1.4

0.2

3. Constitutional Avoidance. Another canon that is particularly
top-heavy is the canon of constitutional avoidance, which also happens
to be a highly consequential and controversial canon.149 I would not
have confidently predicted this canon’s top-heaviness, but one can
plausibly explain it. First, there is relatively little room for
constitutional doubts in the lower courts. The lower courts have their
own circuit precedents resolving some constitutional questions, and
more importantly, the Supreme Court’s decisions bind them
absolutely, with even the Court’s dicta attaining nearly binding
status.150 The Supreme Court, on the other hand, has the power to
overrule its precedents or, more commonly, to narrow or reframe
them.151 Many more constitutional questions are therefore debatable in
the Supreme Court than in the lower courts. Consequently, there are
more opportunities for using the canon of constitutional avoidance.
Second, the Court has more need for avoidance because the

149. See, e.g., Neal Kumar Katyal & Thomas P. Schmidt, Active Avoidance: The Modern
Supreme Court and Legal Change, 128 HARV. L. REV. 2109, 2110–12 (2015); Richard A. Posner,
Statutory Interpretation—In the Classroom and In the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 815–16
(1983).
150. See David Klein & Neal Devins, Dicta, Schmicta: Theory Versus Practice in Lower Court
Decision Making, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2021, 2042–49 (2013) (observing that today’s lower
courts only very rarely dismiss the Supreme Court’s statements as dicta).
151. Richard M. Re, Narrowing Precedent in the Supreme Court, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1861,
1862–63 (2014).
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significance of a decision striking down or upholding a statute is greater
in the Supreme Court. As a result, more cases are eligible for and in
need of the avoidance canon at the Supreme Court level.
The Bond litigation concerning the constitutionality of the federal
chemical-weapons statute provides an illustration. The Third Circuit
concluded that the statute clearly covered Mrs. Bond’s conduct of using
a dangerous chemical against her apparently adulterous neighbor.152
Avoidance of the constitutional question—namely, whether the statute
was valid as an exercise of Congress’s power to implement a treaty—
was therefore not possible. The Third Circuit faced the question and
upheld the statute on the authority of Missouri v. Holland.153 In
contrast, the Supreme Court majority in Bond avoided the
constitutional question by holding that the statute did not apply to
Bond’s conduct.154 It could be that the Supreme Court and the Third
Circuit simply disagreed over how clear the statute was. But something
deeper about the avoidance canon was probably at work as well. A
Supreme Court opinion either repudiating Holland or reaffirming its
federalism-threatening implications would have been a very, very big
deal.155 A court of appeals relying on Holland, on the other hand, is
exactly what one would expect—a faithful application of Supreme
Court precedent.
4. Substantive Presumptions. Although the avoidance canon is
top-heavy, several of the policy-based substantive presumptions—
those involving retroactivity, jurisdiction, extraterritoriality, and state
sovereignty—enjoy relative prominence in the lower courts, including
in unpublished district-court decisions. Based on my review of many
cases, it appears that a meaningful proportion of the lower federal
courts’ uses of the presumption against retroactivity arise in the context
152. United States v. Bond, 681 F.3d 149, 153–55 (3d Cir. 2012), rev’d, 134 S. Ct. 2077 (2014).
This was the second Third Circuit decision in the case, as the Third Circuit had previously ruled
that Bond lacked standing to challenge the statute’s constitutionality. United States v. Bond, 581
F.3d 128, 141 (3d Cir. 2009), rev’d, 564 U.S. 211 (2011). The Supreme Court reversed on standing,
necessitating the second Third Circuit ruling.
153. Id. at 180; see Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 432 (1920) (stating that “[i]f the treaty
is valid there can be no dispute about the validity of the statute” that implements it “as a necessary
and proper means to execute the powers of the Government”).
154. Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2087, 2093–94 (2014).
155. See, e.g., Lyle Denniston, Argument Preview: New Look at Old Precedent,
SCOTUSBLOG (Nov. 2, 2013, 12:04 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/11/argument-previewnew-look-at-old-precedent [https://perma.cc/FX3F-AUGH] (“[T]he coming decision in Bond. v.
United States may wind up with a very prominent place in constitutional history . . . . It is, indeed,
difficult to imagine how this case can be decided without making history.”).
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of state legislation and often cite a state-law source for the rule.156 Some
uses of the extraterritoriality canon likewise involve state law, such as
the question whether a state statute applies outside the state’s
borders.157 The lower courts’ need to interpret state law does not,
however, explain the extreme bottom-heaviness of the canon calling
for narrow construction of federal subject-matter jurisdiction. That
canon’s importance in the lower courts instead largely reflects judicialstructural considerations and perhaps differences in preferences across
tiers of the judiciary. Hierarchical divergence in the use of substantive
canons in general, and the jurisdiction canon in particular, warrant
further consideration once all of this Part’s results are in view.158
D. The Matched-Corpus Method: Following the Same Cases at All
Three Levels
Recall the distinction between doing different things and doing
things differently. One objection to cross-tier comparisons like those
presented above is that the bodies of cases encountered at different
levels of the system are very different. Of course the Supreme Court
decisions use many more canons and tools, one might say, because its
docket is composed almost entirely of only the hardest, most debatable
cases. Most statutory-interpretation decisions in the lower courts are
easy. Limiting one’s study to published opinions—which the lower
courts reserve for the small minority of cases that are difficult or
interesting—partly corrects for differences in case difficulty, but not
completely. What we really want, the critic would say, is an apples-toapples comparison: Do the decisions of the different courts still look so
different when they are deciding closely comparable cases?
I think the critic’s demand is misguided to a significant degree.
Apples-to-apples comparisons are nice, but it is also very much worth
knowing that apples, which predominate at the Supreme Court, make
up only a small percentage of the fruit in the lower courts’ basket, with
the rest being composed of lemons and squishy bananas. The most
important thing, when it comes to understanding the lower courts,
might be the realization that there are so few apples to be found! That

156. E.g., City of Gary v. Shafer, No. 2:07-CV-56-PRC, 2007 WL 2962640, at *4 (N.D. Ind.
Oct. 4, 2007) (Indiana law).
157. E.g., Russo v. APL Marine Servs., Ltd., 135 F. Supp. 3d 1089, 1094 (C.D. Cal. 2015)
(California law); Union Underwear Co. v. GI Apparel, Inc., No. CIV. A. 08-00124 (WHW) 2008
WL 3833475, at *4 (D.N.J. Aug. 13, 2008) (Kentucky law).
158. See infra Part II.G.
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is, while we call all of these things courts, they are different institutions
with different roles doing rather different things.
Nonetheless, the critic’s request can be accommodated by using
what I call the matched-corpus method.159 This method compares the
Supreme Court’s decisions with the lower courts’ decisions in the very
same cases. To assemble this matched corpus, I collected all Supreme
Court decisions interpreting statutes for the years 2011 through 2015
inclusive, 218 decisions in all.160 I then collected the court of appeals
opinion under review in each of those Supreme Court cases, along with
the district-court opinion that led to that court of appeals case. One can
then observe the same cases—the apples—as they proceed through
each of the three levels of the judicial system. By looking at the same
cases at different points in the process, the matched-corpus method
neutralizes the biasing effect of the Supreme Court’s case-selection
processes. This method therefore reveals whether different kinds of
courts do things differently even when they are doing the same things.
Locating the court of appeals opinions was not particularly
difficult. A published or unpublished opinion was located for every
case.161 The district courts did present some complications, but relevant
opinions were located for the large majority of the cases. The goal was
to obtain any reasoned written opinions that addressed the statutoryinterpretive question later addressed by the Supreme Court. This
required searching several sources, including Westlaw, Lexis,

159. Brudney and Baum use a similar technique to compare the use of dictionaries and
legislative history in several selected areas of statutory law. See Brudney & Baum, Protean
Statutory Interpretation, supra note 1, at 701–02; James J. Brudney & Lawrence Baum,
Dictionaries 2.0: Exploring the Gap Between the Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals, 125 YALE
L.J. FORUM 104, 104–05 (2015) [hereinafter Brudney & Baum, Dictionaries 2.0]. The study here
examines more than a dozen interpretive tools and all areas of law, though for a shorter period of
time.
160. I used a lenient standard for identifying the Court’s statutory cases. Cases that, for
instance, combined both statutory interpretation and constitutional law were included in the data
set. See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 568 U.S. 106 (2013) (interpreting a statute to assign the
burden of proof on an issue to the defendant and then holding the statute constitutional as so
construed). Examples of the kinds of cases that were excluded were constitutional cases; cases
applying common-law doctrines such as interstate water disputes, preclusion, and abstention; and
those habeas and qualified-immunity cases (quite a few of which were summary reversals) that
only concerned whether a certain right was “clearly established” by precedent. I excluded
opinions on denial of certiorari, as those are not merits decisions. Also excluded were the
relatively few cases that came from state courts, as this study concerns only comparisons between
the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts.
161. A small handful of cases involved a direct appeal from a three-judge district court to the
Supreme Court. In those rare cases, I treated the opinion of the three-judge district court as a
decision from the court of appeals rather than the district court.
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Bloomberg Law (which draws material from PACER dockets), and
petitions for certiorari (the appendices to which include copies of any
prior opinions in a case). In about 10 percent of the cases, there was no
district-court decision to look for, as in petitions for review of agency
action that begin in the courts of appeals. In a few more cases, a districtcourt opinion was located but was excluded because it did not or could
not address the issue the Supreme Court addressed.162 In some cases,
the district court’s decision on the relevant question took the form of a
one-line order deciding a motion or an oral ruling delivered during a
hearing. These were not included in the quantitative analysis. In total,
a relevant district-court opinion was located for about 80 percent of the
Supreme Court decisions.163
As one would expect, the lower-court decisions in the matched
corpus are not at all typical of the output of the lower courts. Of the
court of appeals cases in the matched corpus, slightly more than 85
percent generated published opinions, compared to a publication rate
of about 15 percent for all decisions in the courts of appeals.164 About
20 percent of the court of appeals cases in the matched corpus have
dissents, which again far exceeds the usual dissent rate, which is less
than 3 percent.165 In the ordinary world, the large majority of cases do
not yield any district-court opinion available on Lexis or Westlaw.166
162. E.g., Gelboim v. Bank of Am. Corp., 135 S. Ct. 897, 902, 904 (2015) (addressing an issue
of appellate jurisdiction raised sua sponte by the court of appeals).
163. In a few instances, the corpus contains more than one district-court decision from a case,
such as where the district court addresses the same issue in one opinion and then addresses it
again after a motion for reconsideration.
164. Supra note 101 and accompanying text.
165. Lee Epstein, William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Why (and When) Judges
Dissent: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 3 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 101, 106 n.9 (2011)
(reporting a court of appeals dissent rate of 2.6 percent for 1990–2007); see also Harry T. Edwards,
Collegial Decision Making in the U.S. Courts of Appeals at *58 (Nov. 2017) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (estimating a court of appeals dissent rate of 1.3
percent for 2011–16). Among published decisions, the dissent rate increases, but it remains far
below the rate of dissents found in the matched-corpus data set. See id. (reporting a 10.6 percent
dissent rate for published court of appeals decisions for 2011–16); see also JENNIFER BARNES
BOWIE, DONALD R. SONGER & JOHN SZMER, THE VIEW FROM THE BENCH AND CHAMBERS 140
(2014) (reporting dissent rates in the range of 8–12 percent for published decisions from the mid1970s to 2002).
166. See Christina L. Boyd, Opinion Writing in the Federal District Courts, 36 JUST. SYS. J.
254, 261–62 (2015) (reporting that 9 percent of the cases in her database yielded at least 1 opinion
available on Lexis); Hoffman et al., supra note 124, at 693, 751 (reporting that 18 percent of the
district-court cases in their database resulted in an opinion available on Lexis or Westlaw); Peter
Siegelman & John J. Donohue III, Studying the Iceberg from Its Tip: A Comparison of Published
and Unpublished Employment Discrimination Cases, 24 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 1133, 1138, 1143
(1990) (reporting that about 15 percent of employment-discrimination cases in their sample
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But in the matched corpus, there is a reasoned opinion from the district
court for the large majority of the cases, most commonly an
unpublished opinion available through Westlaw or Lexis. Indeed, more
than 10 percent of the cases in the matched corpus had district-court
opinions published in the Federal Supplement or the other official West
reporters (Federal Rules Decisions and Bankruptcy Reporter). This
publication rate far exceeds the usual rate at which cases in the district
courts generate officially published opinions.167 These are the apples
from the lower-court basket, in other words.
Once the matched-corpus database was assembled, it was
searched for canons and other interpretive tools. Given the smaller
number of cases and the opportunity for more fine-grained scrutiny,
the matched-corpus analysis was able to include some tools, such as the
common law, that were too difficult to locate reliably when relying only
on large-n, electronic searches. As elsewhere, cases are counted as
citing a canon even when the canon appears in a concurrence or
dissent, and citations are counted regardless of how much weight the
canon is ultimately given.168 Citations that merely describe what
another court did, however, are excluded, as are those that involve the
interpretation of non-statutory texts.
Tables 2 and 3 present results for those tools that appeared more
than 10 times in the Supreme Court opinions.169 To use linguistic
canons for purposes of exposition, Table 2 shows that those canons
were used in 16 of the 218 Supreme Court opinions, but those canons
appeared in only 9 of the court of appeals decisions. All of the tools

resulted in an opinion available on Lexis).
167. It is difficult to calculate publication rates for district courts because a case may present
several opportunities for a published opinion, such as rulings on dispositive motions, post-trial
motions, and remands after appeal. By the same token, cases in the district court may present no
opportunities for a published opinion, as when a case quickly settles. Probably fewer than 5
percent of district-court cases yield any published opinion. See Boyd, supra note 166, at 262
(reporting that 9 percent of the cases in the data set had a written opinion, of which only slightly
over a third—a total of about 3 percent—were published).
168. See supra Part II.B.1 (explaining why this Article does not make judgments about the
weight of an opinion’s reliance on particular canons). As before, these search terms are on file
with the author.
169. The canons that returned fewer than 10 results include the presumptions against
preemption, retroactivity, extraterritoriality, and implied repeal; the state-sovereignty clearstatement rule; in pari materia; and “no elephants in mouseholes.” For legislative history and
deference regimes, the table includes a composite category as well as subcategories, even though
some subcategories did not have more than 10 appearances. The category for committee reports
includes conference committees. Lenity is included in Table 3 because it had more than 10 results
in the larger corpus reflected in Table 2.
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were, to varying degrees, less prevalent in the lower-court corpus. This
again supports the hypothesis that Supreme Court decisions are more
interpretively rich. Here, the effect persists even within the same cases.
Table 2: Frequency of Tool Use in the Supreme Court/Court of
Appeals Matched Corpus (n = 218 Supreme Court opinions with
matched court of appeals opinions)
Supreme Ct.
cases

Ct. Appeals
cases170

Matched sets

Dictionary

79

34.5

24

Any legislative history

80

59

30

Congressional Record

25

18

6

Committee Reports

66

55.5

23.5

Hearings

23

10

2

Surplusage/superfluity

42

25

8

Any deference regime

32

26

17

Auer/Seminole Rock

5

6

3

Chevron

22

22

14

Skidmore

13

7

3

Consistent usage/
meaningful variation

28

13.5

6.5

Common law

24

13.5

7

Absurd results

21

19

3

Const. avoidance

20

8

5

Linguistic canons

16

9

4

Lenity

12

3

1

Although there are substantial hierarchical divergences in
interpretive complexity even within the matched corpus, it is worth
noting that some of the gaps are narrower in the matched corpus than
they are in the broader universe of all decisions. Recall from Table 1
170. Fractional citations are reported when one decision reviews multiple separate cases from
the lower court and only some of the lower-court cases use the tool.
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that citations to congressional hearings and the Congressional Record
are extremely rare in the lower courts. Here we see that they are much
more prevalent in the matched corpus. The data do not explain why.
Since the matched corpus contains a disproportionate share of the
hardest cases, it makes sense that courts would turn to more difficult
and less authoritative sources for guidance. It is also possible that
courts and attorneys realize that the case is a good candidate for
certiorari and therefore engage in more exhaustive analysis.
The matched-corpus method also reveals whether the same tools
are being used in the same cases at each level. A “matched set,” as
reported in the far-right column, occurs when the same tool is used at
both levels in the very same case. The tool with the best matching
performance in the corpus was deference, Chevron in particular. But
the general conclusion is that matches are rare. For example, of the 16
Supreme Court cases using a linguistic canon, the corresponding court
of appeals used a linguistic canon in only 4 of them.171 The most
common reason for a failed match is that a tool appeared for the first
time in the Supreme Court. Recall Yates v. United States,172 the
undersized-fish case described in the Introduction. The Supreme Court
used, among other tools, a bevy of textual canons (ejusdem generis,
noscitur a sociis, and antisurplusage), the Congressional Record, and
the statute’s heading, none of which were found in the court of appeals’
decision. The only matches across the two iterations of Yates, among
the tools studied here, were use of the dictionary and the rule of lenity.
The hierarchical disparities in canon frequency are even wider
when one looks at the district courts. Table 3 presents the same kind of
analysis as the previous table, but it includes only those Supreme Court
cases in which a corresponding district-court decision existed and could
be found, which is about 80 percent of the cases. As Table 3 shows,
most tools are used much more often at the Supreme Court level. Tools
with particularly steep drop-offs include constitutional avoidance and
the holistic rule of consistent usage and meaningful variation. The tools
that come closest to parity are deference and legislative history, which
the Supreme Court uses only about twice as often as the district court.
In both instances, however, the picture becomes more complex when

171. Recall that the category of linguistic canons is a composite of ejusdem generis, noscitur a
sociis, expressio unius, and the rule of the last antecedent. In each of the four matches, both courts
used the same canon. For legislative history, a match occurs even if courts use different kinds of
committee reports. To some degree this grouping overstates the low level of cross-tier matching.
172. 135 S. Ct. 1074 (2015).
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one disaggregates the tool into its different varieties. Within the
category of legislative history, the use of committee reports is closest
to parity, while the use of hearings and debates increases sharply as
cases move up the appellate ladder. This finding reinforces the finding
above173 that the lower courts, especially the district courts, tend to
focus on the most accessible and most authoritative kinds of legislative
history, while the Supreme Court is more willing to examine more
obscure sources.

173. Supra Part II.C.2.
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Table 3: Frequency of Tool Use in the Supreme Court/District-Court
Matched Corpus (n = 173.5 Supreme Court opinions with
matched district-court opinions174)
Supreme Ct.
cases

District Ct.
cases

Matched sets

Dictionary

66

14.5

12

Any legislative history

63

27.5

15.5

Congressional Record

22

4.5

3.5

Committee Reports

50

25

11

Hearings

18

1

0

Surplusage/superfluity

35

7

6

Any deference regime

25

10

7

Auer/Seminole Rock

5

2.5

2.5

Chevron

15

8

5

Skidmore

12

2.5

1

Consistent usage/
meaningful variation

22

1

0

Common law

15

2

1

Absurd results

15

5

3

Const. avoidance

15

1

0

Linguistic canons

14

2

0

Lenity

6

1

1

As Table 3 also shows, the number of matched sets—that is,
instances in which the same canon is used in the same case in the district
court and Supreme Court—is staggeringly low for most tools. For the
cases in which the Supreme Court ultimately used a linguistic canon, a
legislative hearing, or the avoidance canon (14, 18, and 15 Supreme
Court cases, respectively), the district courts had used those tools in
none of the same cases. I would not have expected such a high degree

174. The number of Supreme Court opinions includes half a case because in one of the
Supreme Court decisions reviewing two separate cases, only one of the district-court cases had an
opinion.
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of methodological discontinuity within cases. This discontinuity raises
rule-of-law concerns about predictability, as explored further below.175
Even the matched-corpus method overstates, to a degree, the
similarity between courts. Litigation typically narrows in scope as it
moves up the appellate pyramid. In a complicated case, the district
court might resolve dozens of contested matters, but only a few of those
rulings are challenged in the court of appeals, and the Supreme Court
ordinarily addresses only one of them.176 The matched corpus includes
only the opinion from the lower court that addresses the eventual
certiorari issue, not any other opinions in the case. But some of the
included opinions discussed multiple issues, including multiple
interpretive issues, besides the certiorari issue.177 I did not excise the
portions of the opinion dealing with other questions. If the lower-court
corpus were restricted to only the parts of the decisions discussing the
certiorari issue, the lower-court portion of the corpus would be even
more canon poor than it is now.178
A final comment on the matched corpus concerns unpublished
decisions. The difference between the published and unpublished court
of appeals decisions in the corpus is stark. In the unpublished opinions,
interpretive tools other than precedent are almost entirely absent. The
large majority of the unpublished decisions were short and relied on
precedent, most often circuit precedent. At the district-court level,
tools other than precedent were less common in unpublished decisions,
but the distinction between the two types of opinions was not nearly so
dramatic. That the unpublished opinions of the courts of appeals are so
interpretively impoverished likely reflects the fact that the courts of
appeals unilaterally control publication status, use different processes
for the two types of opinions, and give them entirely different
precedential status.179

175. Infra Part II.G.
176. A counterexample is Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., where the Supreme Court
ordered reargument to address a new question not litigated below. 569 U.S. 108, 114 (2013). This
is rare, because the usual rule is that a reviewing court does not consider new issues.
177. An extreme example is Smith v. United States, 568 U.S. 106, 109 (2013), in which the
Supreme Court considered only one question about conspiracy law, while the court of appeals
had issued a lengthy opinion that discussed more than 20 constitutional, statutory, procedural,
and evidentiary matters. United States v. Moore, 651 F.3d 30, 38 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
178. Trimming the lower-court opinions would also affect the amount of matching. It would
slightly reduce the number of cases in which a canon used below disappeared when the case
reached the Supreme Court. It would slightly increase the number of cases in which new canons
showed up for the first time in the Supreme Court.
179. See supra notes 101–02 and accompanying text.
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E. Comparing Textualist Trends at All Three Levels
Interpretive approaches need not remain static over time. They
can change, both in terms of the theoretical goal of interpretation and
in terms of the particular tools that are most important. One notable
shift is that the Supreme Court’s interpretive tools are more textualist
in orientation today than they were several decades ago.180 This section
considers whether the lower courts, especially the vastly understudied
district courts, also underwent a textualist shift. The period under study
for this section is 1975 to 2016.
As stated above, interpretive approaches are distinguished in
practice by which interpretive tools they emphasize.181 Probably the
most readily apparent feature of the new textualism championed by
Justice Scalia and others is its extreme skepticism toward the use of
legislative history.182 The aversion toward legislative history is matched
with a preference for text-based interpretive tools, including whole-act
arguments and linguistic canons.183
Previous work has shown that the federal courts of appeals shifted
toward at least some textualist tools over the last several decades. In
particular, the courts of appeals started to increase their use of
linguistic canons around 1990, and as a result, they use such canons
about twice as often today as they did 30 years ago.184 That pattern
roughly matched a similar trend in the Supreme Court, though the
Supreme Court’s increase apparently started a few years earlier and

180. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 133, at 592–93; Jonathan R. Siegel, The Legacy of
Justice Scalia and His Textualist Ideal, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 857, 858 (2017). This is not to say
that the Court today is full of committed textualists. On the contrary, the Court as a whole did
not adopt Justice Scalia’s boldest theoretical propositions, and it may be that the most significant
recent development in Supreme Court statutory interpretation is a textualist-purposive synthesis
that has quieted the methodological battles. See id. at 859, 874; see also John F. Manning, The
New Purposivism, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 113, 113–82 (2011) (describing the development of a new,
“textually structured” version of purposivism). Even if the textualist wave has crested, the Court
is still more textualist today than it was 40 years ago, especially in terms of the tools that the Court
emphasizes, which is the focus here.
181. Supra Part II.A.
182. See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE LAW 29–30 (1997); Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory
Construction, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 59, 60–66 (1988); William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New
Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 623–24, 650–56 (1990); Caleb Nelson, What Is Textualism?, 91
VA. L. REV. 347, 361–62 (2005).
183. See, e.g., United Sav. Ass’n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484 U.S.
365, 371 (1988) (making the now-famous statement that “[s]tatutory construction . . . is a holistic
endeavor”); SCALIA, supra note 182, at 25–27; Eskridge, supra note 182, at 660–64.
184. CROSS, supra note 1, at 190–91; Bruhl, supra note 1, at 499–506.
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was much steeper, such that the Court currently uses linguistic canons
substantially more frequently than the courts of appeals.185 Something
similar happened with dictionaries in recent decades; their use has
increased dramatically in the Supreme Court and increased somewhat
in the courts of appeals.186 Existing research also shows that the courts
of appeals, over the same time period, reduced their use of legislative
history.187 These changes—linguistic canons and dictionaries up,
legislative history down—indicate a shift toward textualist
methodology in the courts of appeals.
In light of those findings, we might wonder how these changes
affected the district courts. Did this same pattern occur in the district
courts? If so, roughly when? And what about other indicators of
textualism, like the whole-act rule? Did both published and
unpublished opinions change? The short answer to those questions is
that pro-textualist patterns exist at each level, though the textualist
shift is less pronounced as one moves down the judicial hierarchy from
the Supreme Court to the courts of appeals to the district courts.
Further, the shift toward textualist tools was stronger in published
opinions than in unpublished ones.
This Section measures the rise of textualism at different levels of
the judiciary over a period of 40 years by tracking patterns in the use
of legislative history, linguistic canons, holistic-textual tools, and
dictionaries. For purposes of this study, the use of legislative history is
defined as citations to committee reports (including conference
committees), the Congressional Record, and congressional hearings.
There are other forms of legislative history, of course, but this list
includes the most important category, namely committee reports, and
all of the items on the list are particularly easy to identify through
electronic searches. The category of linguistic canons is composed of
four familiar rules of word association and grammar: ejusdem generis,
noscitur a sociis, expressio unius, and the rule of the last antecedent.
All of these linguistic canons can be captured with good accuracy
through electronic searches. The search for holistic-textual tools is
meant to capture a set of canons that encourage courts to draw
inferences from the whole act or even other statutes, namely the rule

185. Bruhl, supra note 1, at 499–506.
186. Brudney & Baum, Dictionaries 2.0, supra note 159, at 105; John Calhoun, Note,
Measuring the Fortress: Explaining Trends in Supreme Court and Circuit Court Dictionary Use,
124 YALE L.J. 484, 497–502 (2014).
187. CROSS, supra note 1, at 183–87; Parrillo, supra note 121, at 389.
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of consistent usage and meaningful variation,188 the in pari materia
canon, and the rule against surplusage. These holistic-textual tools are
a bit harder to search for, and the search terms are likely
underinclusive, but that should be true across courts and time periods.
Dictionaries include both legal and general dictionaries. For each tool,
the searches are intended to capture their use in statutory
interpretation while excluding uses in other contexts like contract
interpretation (which is common in the lower courts’ diversity docket)
or constitutional interpretation.
The following figures present the results for the period spanning
from 1975 to 2016. For each court, there are markers showing the
citation rate for each year and a smoothed curve that is meant to ease
visualization by showing the trend over time.189 The curve for the
Supreme Court is thicker to visually signal the greater variability in the
Court’s annual rates, which stems from the Court’s small docket size.
The figures separately display published and unpublished district-court
decisions. Unpublished decisions from the courts of appeals are
omitted throughout this Section because they very rarely include any
of the tools at issue. Note that the vertical scales of the figures differ,
as some of the tools are more prevalent than others.
Figure 4 shows legislative history, the tool most disfavored by
textualists. Previous work has traced the use of legislative history by
the Supreme Court and, to a much lesser degree, the courts of
appeals.190 This study brings in the district courts and compares their
practices to those of the higher courts. As Figure 4 shows, the use of
legislative history reached a recent peak at all three levels in the midto late-1980s and has declined since then. The citation rate is
substantially higher in the Supreme Court, but the trends are parallel
across all three levels.

188. This canon instructs that the same language in different sections or statutes should be
given the same meaning, and different language given different meaning.
189. The smoothed lines in the figures reflect locally weighted regressions (known as
LOWESS or LOESS) calculated with a modest smoothing factor of 0.33. See WILLIAM S.
CLEVELAND, THE ELEMENTS OF GRAPHING DATA 168–72 (rev. ed. 1994) (describing the
technique). LOWESS smoothing can be performed with statistics packages or an Excel add-in.
190. For the Supreme Court, see, for example, Michael H. Koby, The Supreme Court’s
Declining Reliance on Legislative History: The Impact of Justice Scalia’s Critique, 36 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 369, 384–87 (1999); Law & Zaring, supra note 93, at 1716 fig.5. For studies of the courts of
appeals, in some cases with comparisons to the Supreme Court, see, for example, CROSS, supra
note 1, at 183–87; Brudney & Baum, Protean Statutory Interpretation, supra note 1, at 700–11;
Parrillo, supra note 121, at 365–66.
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Figure 4: Use of Legislative History in Different Courts, Annual
Citation Rates and Trends, 1975–2016

The next several figures show the use of the three tools favored by
textualists, namely dictionaries, holistic-textual tools, and linguistic
canons. At the start of the period under study, all three courts used
these tools at similar rates. In the Supreme Court, the use of all three
tools began to increase in the 1980s, though the variability in the yearly
data makes it hard to pinpoint the precise turning point. The Court’s
citation rate is now much higher than it was several decades ago. The
increase is also present in the lower courts’ published opinions, but it
was not as sharp and perhaps started a bit later. Within the lower
courts, the increase was larger for the courts of appeals than for the
district courts.
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Figure 5: Use of Dictionaries in Different Courts, Annual Citation Rates
and Trends, 1975–2016

Figure 6: Use of Holistic-Textual Canons, Annual Citation Rates and
Trends, 1975–2016
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Figure 7: Use of Linguistic Canons, Annual Citation Rates and Trends,
1975–2016191

In the district courts, the increase in the use of textualist-oriented
tools manifested itself in published opinions, but the citation rate in the
unpublished opinions, which are much more numerous, was essentially
flat for 40 years. This divergence between published and unpublished
opinions requires some comment. First, recall that district-court
decisions are selected for publication when the authoring judges and
West’s attorneys believe that they have broad significance.192 The
results show that the important decisions—those that address questions
of first impression, for example—use textualist tools more than they
used to. Second, although the citation rates in unpublished opinions
remained fairly steady, the raw numbers of uses of the canons did
increase a great deal over time. The rate remained steady because the
denominator—that is, the number of unpublished interpretive
decisions available through Westlaw—increased sharply from about
300 in 1980 to over 12,000 for each of the last several years. The district
courts are busier than they used to be, but most of that massive increase
in the denominator reflects the fact that a greater proportion of their
decisions now make their way to Westlaw.193 To be included in my
191. For the sake of visualization, the figure omits the 2013 data point for the Supreme Court,
which is an outlier at 13 percent. It was included when calculating the trendline.
192. Supra text accompanying note 105.
193. See supra note 128 (describing a huge jump in the number of unpublished decisions
around 2005).
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denominator, a decision must include at least some discussion of
statutory interpretation.194 Nonetheless, it may be that Westlaw’s more
capacious collection methods mean that the average unpublished
interpretive decision on Westlaw today is less complicated than the
average unpublished interpretive decision on Westlaw from the past.195
If that is so, then it may be that Westlaw’s more exhaustive collection
methods are masking an increased propensity over time to cite
textualist tools in otherwise similarly significant unpublished opinions.
Similar forces could make the drop in the use of legislative history in
unpublished decisions look somewhat more pronounced than it really
is.
The focus of this study is how interpretation differs across courts,
not causal mechanisms, but it is natural to speculate about what caused
the textualist shift seen above. Were the lower courts responding to
changes at the Supreme Court, or more specifically to Justice Scalia’s
crusade against legislative history on and off the bench? Does the
credit go to President Reagan’s picks for the lower courts and his
Department of Justice’s textualist litigation strategies?196 Were trends
in the broader legal culture influencing all actors at once? One needs
to be cautious in making causal claims. Nonetheless, the partisan
makeup of the lower courts does not appear to explain the shift.197
Reagan-appointed judges might explain the initial change, but the
change persists in the Clinton and Obama eras. Textualism is a
bipartisan phenomenon. Indeed, although this is anecdotal, some of
the most text- and canon-heavy interpretive battles in the last few
Supreme Court terms have involved duels between Democratic

194. See supra Part II.B.2.
195. To test that intuition, I compared the unpublished district-court cases in the denominator
for 1990 and 2015 to see what proportion of those cases was made up of (1) pro se cases and (2)
cases in which prisoners seek noncapital habeas relief or resentencing. Those are two categories
particularly likely to involve settled law or frivolous claims. Cf. FED. JUDICIAL CTR., 2003–2004
DISTRICT COURT CASE-WEIGHTING STUDY 5 tbl.1 (2005) (assigning very low workload
weightings to noncapital habeas and resentencing proceedings). The 2015 cases contained much
higher proportions of both kinds of cases.
196. See OFFICE OF LEGAL POL’Y, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, USING AND MISUSING
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: A RE-EVALUATION OF THE STATUS OF LEGISLATIVE HISTORY IN
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION i, v (1989) (casting doubt on the validity of legislative history as
an interpretive source).
197. See CROSS, supra note 1, at 185–86 (showing that the periods with more heavily
Republican courts of appeals do not closely align with the periods of increasing textualism); see
also Gluck & Posner, supra note 1, at 1311–12 (reporting that younger judges were more canon
oriented and formalist than older judges, regardless of their appointing president).
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appointees.198
Subject to confirmation and refinement by other evidence, the
results above support at least three tentative conclusions. First, the
lower courts generally paralleled the Supreme Court in deemphasizing
legislative history and increasing their use of linguistic and holistictextual canons and dictionaries. Second, the changes in the lower
courts were not as dramatic in magnitude.199 Whatever its shifting
fortunes in the Supreme Court, textualism did not conquer the lower
courts. Third, the use of legislative history and characteristically
textualist canons is highest by far in the Supreme Court and lowest in
the district courts and, within the district courts, lower in their
unpublished opinions than in their published opinions. This last crosstier disparity once again supports the general hypothesis that lower
courts’ interpretive approaches are simpler in that all tools of
interpretation, besides precedent, would appear less often.
F. The Lifecycle of a Federalism Canon
Some canons may be timeless, or at least old enough and Latin
sounding enough that they seem timeless. But other canons have been
born within living memory. The phenomenon of interest here is the
“digestion” of a new canon through the judicial system—that is, the
way a canon begins at the top of the judicial hierarchy and then diffuses
through the system.
It is hard to identify clear breaks in interpretive rules that could
be used to test the digestion hypothesis. Probably the best modern
candidate is the Rehnquist Court’s creation of powerful federalism
clear-statement rules out of what had previously been presumptions
against preemption and interference with state sovereignty.200 Some
invocations of the federalism clear-statement rules are hard to pin
down, as they can blend into ordinary preemption at the margins. For

198. E.g., Lockhart v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 958 (2016) (dueling opinions from Justices
Sotomayor and Kagan); Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074 (2015) (dueling opinions from
Justices Ginsburg and Kagan); see also Elena Kagan, The Scalia Lecture, at min. 18 (Nov. 17,
2015),
http://today.law.harvard.edu/in-scalia-lecture-kagan-discusses-statutory-interpretation
[https://perma.cc/ND8F-QSJD] (describing herself as a textualist).
199. This finding aligns with other dictionary studies, which found that the Supreme Court’s
affection for dictionaries far outstrips the lower courts’ use of that source. Supra note 186 and
accompanying text (discussing findings of Brudney, Baum, and Calhoun).
200. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear
Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 619–29 (1992) (discussing
the development of these canons).
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the sake of reliable searching, this Section focuses on one precisely
definable version of the canon, which governs federal statutes that
abrogate state sovereign immunity.201 It is likely that some other canons
would display similar dynamics.
The data provide some support for the digestion hypothesis, as
Figure 8 shows. The bars in the figure show the number of times the
Supreme Court used the canon each year.202 The Supreme Court issued
a burst of decisions using the state-sovereignty canon around 1990, but
the Court’s use of the canon was already declining by the time its use
peaked in the lower courts around a decade later. During those peak
years in the lower courts, the canon was more common in published
opinions than in unpublished ones, which is what one would expect.
Today, the canon has a strange citation profile, as the canon is
especially prominent in unpublished district-court decisions. This
pattern is consistent with a scenario in which the Supreme Court’s
actions initially generate a need for novel applications and refinements
of the canon, and then the canon becomes more routine and hemmed
in by precedents.

201. E.g., Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985) (stating that “Congress
may abrogate the States’ constitutionally secured immunity from suit in federal court only by
making its intention unmistakably clear in the language of the statute”).
202. The number of Supreme Court citations is used instead of rates for two reasons. First,
one cannot present a very meaningful annual rate given the small numbers involved. Second, for
the lower-court judges observing the Supreme Court’s work, it is not clear whether citation rates
or raw numbers are more salient.
Because the Supreme Court data in Figure 8 are expressed in raw numbers, this figure
cannot be used to compare the rate at which the Supreme Court cites the canon against the rates
at which the lower courts cite it. Citation rates and ratios can be compared using Figures 1–3
above. Over the last decade, the Court’s overall citation rate is higher than the citation rates in
the lower courts, though not vastly so.
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Figure 8: Use of State-Sovereignty Canon in Different Courts, 1980–
2016203

G. Summary of Key Findings
It is time to summarize the key findings from the analyses above,
discuss their implications, and compare the results to the predictions
from Part I.
When it comes to statutory interpretation, the lower courts—
especially the district courts—are both doing different things than the
Supreme Court and doing things differently. They do different things
in that the lower courts rarely encounter the difficult interpretive
questions of first impression that the Supreme Court regularly
confronts. Therefore, it is not surprising that virtually all of the
interpretive tools of first impression—legislative history, linguistic
inferences, substantive canons, and the rest—appeared far less often in
the lower courts. The paucity of canons is especially pronounced in
their unpublished opinions. But even when courts at different levels do
confront similar cases, as in the matched-corpus study, lower courts still
behave differently in several respects. We repeatedly see, for one thing,
that their interpretive methods remain simpler in that fewer tools, aside
203. To ease visualization, the citation rates are displayed using LOWESS smoothing with the
smoothing parameter set to 0.33. See supra note 189 (describing the LOWESS technique).
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from precedent, are used at lower levels of the judicial system.
In addition to differing in how intensively they use interpretive
tools overall, courts also differ with respect to which tools are most and
least common at different levels of the system. To generalize, the more
complicated the canon, the more overrepresented it is likely to be in
the Supreme Court’s opinions. For example, several holisticinterpretation canons are highly overrepresented in the Supreme
Court; these include the presumptions of consistent usage and
meaningful variation, the presumption against implied repeal, and the
“no elephants in mouseholes” rule. By contrast, some of the traditional
substantive canons and presumptions—which operate as handy judicial
shortcuts—are relatively well represented in the lower courts.204
Legislative history falls near the middle, but courts differ in how often
they use different types of legislative history. All courts use committee
reports the most, but the Supreme Court, unlike the lower courts,
makes substantial use of less accessible and authoritative forms as
well.205
The most top-heavy canon in the study—that is, the one most
overrepresented in the Supreme Court as compared to lower courts—
is the “no elephants in mouseholes” canon. Several different drivers of
divergence all push this canon toward top-heaviness. To begin with,
although the idea behind the canon appeals to timeless common sense,
the named canon is fairly new.206 As a result, the lower courts and
attorneys were still learning about it during the study period.207 But
even aside from its novelty, other features of the canon suggest that it
will remain particularly top-heavy. The canon is complex in that it
requires an assessment of the importance of one statutory provision as
measured against the goals of the larger regulatory regime of which it
is a part. And as a tool that applies paradigmatically to major disputes
in administrative law, the opportunities to use it increase, relative to
caseload, as one climbs the judicial hierarchy.
At the opposite end of the spectrum, the canon calling for narrow
interpretations of jurisdictional statutes is extremely bottom-heavy.
Although it is one of the most commonly used canons in the lower
federal courts, it is not very common in the modern Supreme Court.
Perhaps for that reason, this canon is also relatively unknown to
204.
205.
206.
207.

Supra Part II.C fig.2.
Supra Part II.C.2.
Its first appearance was in Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001).
See Bruhl, supra note 1, at 543–45 (describing the early spread of the canon).
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legislation scholars, drawing much less scholarly attention than the topheavy elephant canon.208 The jurisdiction canon’s extraordinary
bottom-heaviness is largely attributable to structural factors like
limited appeal opportunities and the Supreme Court’s discretionary
docket. Some of the disparity may also reflect divergent preferences:
the lower courts have caseload-lightening reasons to narrow access to
federal courts, while the current Supreme Court may favor broad
federal jurisdiction so that it can expand its menu of certiorari petitions
or increase federal control over wayward state courts.209
Over time, the lower courts’ interpretive practices generally shift
in line with trends in the Supreme Court’s practices, but not perfectly.
Sometimes there are lags as new developments, such as the Rehnquist
Court’s new federalism canons, diffuse through the system. Further,
the textualist turn that started in the mid-1980s—one of the most
significant changes in the Supreme Court’s interpretive practices—was
less drastic at each step down in the judicial system. To be sure, the
lower courts now use legislative history much less than they did in the
mid-1980s.210 Yet we now have robust evidence that the Supreme
Court’s contemporaneous big shift toward textualist tools—linguistic
canons, holistic-textual inferences, and dictionaries—was more muted
in the lower courts, especially in the district courts.211 This finding
broadly coheres with Brudney and Baum’s conclusion that the lower
courts’ interpretive methods remain eclectic as compared to the
dictionary-obsessed monoculture toward which the Supreme Court
sometimes seems headed.212
These results require us to qualify some noteworthy recent
scholarly findings that were based on Supreme Court practice. For
example, Eskridge and Baer found that the Supreme Court’s cases
involving deference to agency interpretations frequently cite amicus
briefs filed by agencies and the Solicitor General.213 Further, they
found that the government has a very high win rate in such cases, which
is surprising given the informality of that form of agency

208. Compare Bruhl, supra note 1, at 542–46 (describing the rise and crystallization of the
elephant canon), with Bruhl, supra note 89, at 504 (noting that the jurisdiction canon has
“escape[d] the notice of Supreme Court-oriented scholarship”).
209. Id. at 553–55.
210. Supra Part II.E fig.4.
211. Supra Part II.E figs.5, 6 & 7; see also sources cited supra note 186 (previous studies of the
use of dictionaries by the Supreme Court and courts of appeals).
212. Brudney & Baum, Protean Statutory Interpretation, supra note 1, at 687–89, 752.
213. Eskridge & Baer, supra note 83, at 1098–99, 1111–15.
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interpretation.214 The results above show that lower courts rarely cite
such briefs, likely because such briefs are so rarely available at earlier
stages of litigation. The fact that the Supreme Court relies on agency
interpretations that did not exist at the time of the lower court’s
decision raises normative questions about whether it is appropriate for
the universe of admissible interpretive materials to expand after a
grant of certiorari.215
Recent work on the Roberts Court by Anita Krishnakumar shows
that substantive canons are used rather little compared to other tools,216
but the results from the lower courts reveal a more complicated
picture. The avoidance canon is indeed rare in lower courts for reasons
discussed above,217 but several of the substantive presumptions—
against retroactivity, against extraterritoriality, against federal
jurisdiction, and against abrogation of state immunity—are
overrepresented in the district courts, the courts of appeals, or both.218
In part, this difference is due to the lower courts’ diversity docket.
Several of the traditional substantive canons—such as the presumption
against retroactivity—have state-law cognates that are employed with
some frequency by the lower federal courts. It is also worth noting that
the chief users of some substantive canons, including the statesovereignty clear-statement rule, vary over time. The Roberts Court
has been a quiet period for federalism canons compared to the
Rehnquist Court, but lower courts still spend some time working
through the federalism canons’ implications.219
The study also highlights yet another complexity in courts’
statutory-interpretation practices. Everyone knows that interpretive
practices are far from uniform.220 The matched-corpus study shows that
different canons are often invoked within the same case as it moves
through the judicial system.221 Usually that is because the Supreme
Court’s opinion introduces tools not used below, though sometimes
tools used below disappear as the case progresses. This discontinuity

214. Id. at 1143–44.
215. See Bruhl, supra note 22, at 463–65.
216. Anita S. Krishnakumar, Reconsidering Substantive Canons, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 825, 825
(2017); see also id. at 893–95 (reporting that the Supreme Court, from 2006 to 2012, used language
canons more often than substantive canons).
217. Supra Part II.C.3.
218. Supra Part II.C.4.
219. Supra Part II.F.
220. See supra text accompanying note 30.
221. Supra Part II.D.
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threatens the hope that the canons, while rarely outcome
determinative, can at least form a more or less reliable “interpretive
regime.” As Eskridge and Frickey wrote,
An interpretive regime tells lower court judges, agencies, and citizens
how strings of words in statutes will be read, what presumptions will
be entertained as to statutes’ scope and meaning, and what auxiliary
materials might be consulted to resolve ambiguities . . . . [B]y
rendering statutory interpretation more predictable, regular, and
coherent, interpretive regimes can contribute to the rule of law.222

Even if there is a somewhat reliable interpretive regime at the
Supreme Court level, the matched-corpus results show that there may
not be a predictable regime across courts, even within the life of given
case. In addition, this discontinuity may reinforce the growth of the
specialist Supreme Court bar composed of attorneys who know the
Court’s interpretive language.223
A relative bright spot in terms of predictability is the Chevron
doctrine of deference to agency interpretation. Of all the tools under
study, it had the highest rate of matched sets. A potential explanation
is that Chevron provides a relatively straightforward, universally
known framework for analysis in agency cases. It can serve this
function of structuring argument whether or not it predictably dictates
results, and indeed the framework’s ability to accommodate pro- and
anti-agency rulings may contribute to its prevalence.224
III. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS: WHAT
INTERPRETIVE DIVERGENCE MEANS FOR SCHOLARS, COURTS,
TEACHERS, AND ADVOCATES
The results described above reveal a degree of divergence in the
interpretive methods used at different levels of the federal judiciary.
Lower courts use almost all the interpretive tools, apart from
precedent, less than the Supreme Court. More interestingly, courts

222. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Phillip P. Frickey, The Supreme Court, 1993 Term—
Foreword: Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REV. 26, 66 (1994).
223. See generally Lazarus, supra note 37 (observing the growing dominance of the Supreme
Court bar).
224. Cf. Adrian Vermeule, Chevron as a Legal Framework, JOTWELL (Oct. 24, 2017)
(reviewing Kristin Hickman & Nicholas R. Bednar, Chevron’s Inevitability, 85 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 5 (2017)), https://adlaw.jotwell.com/chevron-as-a-legal-framework [https://perma.cc/N52H2597] (describing Chevron as a doctrinal and rhetorical framework that serves a coordinating
function of “provid[ing] a common language” for the articulation of competing perspectives).

BRUHL IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2018]

STATUTORY INTERPRETATION

9/26/2018 10:39 AM

69

emphasize different tools. The tip of the iceberg, the Supreme Court,
is not representative of the whole.
This Article’s findings have implications for several audiences.
These findings can help scholars evaluate normative prescriptions and
identify future lines of research. The findings might suggest that the
Supreme Court and other courts should change their practices. The
findings are also useful for advocates and their professors. The
following pages address the implications of interpretive divergence for
each of those audiences.
A. Implications for Scholars
The findings presented above provide a basis for assessing
normative prescriptions aimed at the lower courts. I argued in previous
work that lower courts should use simpler methods of statutory
interpretation than the Supreme Court in recognition of their
institutional constraints, which include the need to handle more cases
in less time and with weaker briefing.225 That recommendation to
simplify means, among other things, that the lower courts should rely
less on complicated whole-code structural arguments and legislative
history and rely more on other decisionmakers like higher courts and
administrative agencies.226 The results here, together with other
research, show that the lower courts follow these recommendations in
several respects. The lower courts rely heavily on precedent, including
nonbinding dicta,227 and they also use the Chevron deference doctrine
regularly and probably more faithfully than the Supreme Court.228 The
lower courts engage in complicated holistic-textual analysis relatively
rarely.229
The aspect of lower-court interpretation that does not fit my
previous normative prescription as well is their use of legislative
history, which remains high in absolute terms, though only about half

225. Bruhl, supra note 22, at 470, 494–95.
226. Id. at 474–84; see also ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN
INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION 1 (2006) (arguing from institutional
premises that all courts should use simple interpretive methods).
227. See, e.g., supra Part I.B.C.3 and text accompanying note 179; see also Neal Devins &
David Klein, The Vanishing Common Law Judge?, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 595, 597, 610, 613 (2017)
(showing that district courts now cite precedent, especially circuit precedent, much more heavily
and deferentially than they did in the past).
228. See supra Part II.C figs.1 & 2; see also Barnett & Walker, supra note 107, at 3–6 (arguing
that the courts of appeals take Chevron more seriously than the Supreme Court does).
229. Supra Parts II.C, II.D tbl.3.
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as frequent as it used to be.230 A closer look, however, shows that the
lower courts’ use of legislative history is, even more than the Supreme
Court’s, heavily tilted toward committee reports rather than floor
debates or legislative hearings.231 This makes sense because piecing
together a patchwork of speeches, colloquies, and witness statements
into a probative picture of a statute’s intent is a particularly tall order
for pinched lower courts.232 It is an important open question whether
the dominance of committee reports will and should persist in an era
of unorthodox lawmaking characterized by omnibus legislation,
emergency legislation, and massive last-minute amendments—a world
in which committee reports are less valuable, when they even exist.233
Justice Jackson’s “committee reports only” compromise234 seems
increasingly impracticable.
These findings also have implications for the scholarly movement
for methodological stare decisis. The conventional view is that
interpretive methodology does not receive ordinary stare decisis effect,
but some scholars advocate changing that.235 Even in the absence of a
comprehensive, well-established system of methodological stare
decisis, the results here show that the lower courts still respond to, or
at least roughly parallel, the interpretive practices and shifts of the
Supreme Court.236 But if the federal judicial system is quasiprecedential already, then there is not much room for a formal
precedential system to bring greater alignment. Furthermore, to the
extent there are real differences across courts—and there certainly still
are—those differences are not entirely traceable to the lack of a
formalized system of precedent. They are, instead, at least partly the
result of hardwired, structural features of the judicial system. That
suggests that some meaningful amount of interpretive divergence is

230. Supra Part II.E fig.4.
231. Supra Part II.C.2.
232. Bruhl, supra note 22, at 474–76.
233. See generally Abbe R. Gluck, Anne Joseph O’Connell & Rosa Po, Unorthodox
Lawmaking, Unorthodox Rulemaking, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1789, 1799–1826 (2015) (summarizing
the rise of various kinds of non-textbook lawmaking processes).
234. Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 395–96 (1951) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
235. See, e.g., Sydney Foster, Should Courts Give Stare Decisis Effect to Statutory
Interpretation Methodology?, 96 GEO. L.J. 1863, 1872–97 (2008); Gluck, supra note 1, at 1754,
1765–66, 1848–55; Jordan Wilder Connors, Note, Treating Like Subdecisions Alike: The Scope of
Stare Decisis As Applied to Judicial Methodology, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 681, 705–08 (2008).
236. Supra Part II.E.
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going to endure.237
The centrality of precedent in the lower courts’ interpretive
practices highlights the value of more work on that topic. Until
recently, precedent’s role in the statutory-interpretation literature has
been highly compartmentalized in that scholars have focused largely
on the problem of when a court may overrule one of its own on-point
precedents.238 Precedent did not have a place on the original version of
Eskridge & Frickey’s iconic “funnel of abstraction,” which provides a
structure for their account of eclectic interpretation.239 At the very
bottom of the funnel, which is reserved for the most concrete and
authoritative sources, is statutory text.240 Next is legislative history.241
That arrangement of sources becomes more understandable when one
recalls that the funnel was originally developed in an attempt to explain
Supreme Court statutory interpretation.242 Recent iterations of the
funnel now give a prominent place to precedent.243 Still, precedent
plays many roles in statutory interpretation, especially in lower
courts—binding authority, persuasive authority, a source of analogies,
a source for authoritative statements of statutory purposes, a source
for interpretive principles, and more.244 There is much to learn here.
This Article’s findings suggest the value of additional research into
the causes of interpretive divergence. The divergences revealed here
likely have multiple sources, including differences in caseloads and
docket compositions, judicial ideology, and decision-making
structures. One particularly valuable effort would be to isolate the role
of attorneys’ briefing practices in shaping the interpretive styles of
237. For further development of these points, see Bruhl, supra note 27.
238. See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overruling Statutory Precedents, 76 GEO. L.J. 1361
(1988) (arguing that the Court should reconsider its strong presumption against overruling
statutory precedent); Lawrence C. Marshall, “Let Congress Do It”: The Case for an Absolute Rule
of Statutory Stare Decisis, 88 MICH. L. REV. 177 (1989) (arguing for a heightened rule of statutory
stare decisis).
239. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical
Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 353 (1990). The approach is eclectic in the sense that
interpretation draws on all available sources in an ad hoc, case-focused way rather than
proceeding from a foundationalist theory. Id. at 321–22.
240. Id. at 353.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 352–53 & n.123.
243. ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 133, at 629–31; WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR.,
INTERPRETING LAW: A PRIMER ON HOW TO READ STATUTES AND THE CONSTITUTION 141–42
(2016).
244. See generally Lawrence M. Solan, Precedent in Statutory Interpretation, 94 N.C. L. REV.
1165 (2016) (discussing the variety of purposes for which precedent is used).
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various courts.245 In addition, it will be interesting to see whether the
Supreme Court’s interpretive practices change in the post-Scalia era
and, if so, whether lower courts follow. The lower courts did not shift
as far toward textualism as the Supreme Court, and so one would
expect modulated responses to potential future changes too. Above all,
future Supreme Court–focused research should hesitate before
assuming that its results generalize to other federal courts, let alone to
state courts and other interpreters of law.
B. Implications for Courts
A question I can only raise but not resolve here is what the
Supreme Court and other federal courts should do about interpretive
divergence. One possibility is for the Supreme Court to try to reduce
divergence by unifying its own practices, clarifying that its methods are
binding on lower courts, and policing lower courts’ methodology.
Another way to reduce divergence is for the Court to change its own
practices so as to better match the practices of the far more numerous,
and more constrained, lower courts. Those two alternatives could be
characterized as leveling up and leveling down, respectively. A final
alternative, of course, is to do nothing. That last option is appealing if
one thinks that the interpretive system works decently enough despite
divergence and that the potential for greater harmonization is limited.
For the lower courts, the fact of interpretive divergence does not
necessarily mean that they should change their behavior to more
closely mirror the Supreme Court’s. Some differences across tiers of
the judiciary result from the simple fact that the different courts are
doing different things—that is, they are handling different types of
cases. To the extent that they are also doing things differently even
when handling similar cases, at least some of the difference stems from
constraints of the institutional environment. Trying to mimic the
Supreme Court’s interpretive practices may be a poor use of the lower
courts’ limited resources.
C. Implications for Advocates and Their Teachers
“Know your audience” is good advice for attorneys, but at the
same time this Article’s results do not necessarily mean that attorneys
should take their audience’s interpretive practices as fixed. To be sure,
245. An example concerning the Supreme Court is Parrillo’s work on the role of New Deal
agency lawyers and Washington law firms in introducing the Court to legislative history. Parrillo,
supra note 121.
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some interpretive divergences reflect docket composition or hardwired
constraints. But courts also respond to what they get. Various holisticinterpretation tools, for example, are highly top-heavy, but that may
reflect the fact that attorneys are not making these arguments in district
courts and busy judges do not unearth them on their own. If attorneys
made more whole-code arguments to district courts, they would appear
more often in the decisions.
The reality of interpretive divergence suggests that professors
should reorient their Legislation and Statutory Interpretation courses
in certain respects, such as by shifting the emphasis given to various
interpretive tools. To be clear, the mere fact that a canon appears much
more often in the Supreme Court than in the lower courts does not
mean it should be deemphasized in teaching. After all, some
differences between courts are the result of attorneys’ litigation
choices. For some tools, however, including many substantive canons,
there are structural reasons for hierarchical differences in prevalence.
The constitutional-avoidance and state-sovereignty canons have
traditionally received heavy emphasis in Legislation courses,246 and
they are indeed canons that students should know. But to prepare
students for the interpretive practices of the lower courts, where most
of the work is done, it is also important to study the presumption
against preemption and the canon of construing federal jurisdiction
narrowly, which is one of the most prevalent canons of all.247 In
recognition of the diversity jurisdiction of the lower courts, not to
mention the fact that state-court dockets dwarf federal-court dockets,
students should also learn more about state interpretive approaches in
the jurisdictions in which they are most likely to practice.248 Finally,
although legislative history is less important than it used to be, it is still
widely used throughout the federal judiciary. Law students should
certainly be taught how to find legislative history and, more
importantly, how to use it persuasively.
246. For example, they are 2 of the 3 top-billed substantive canons in Eskridge and his
collaborators’ Legislation casebook, along with the rule of lenity. ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note
133, at xv.
247. A laudable development here is HILLEL Y. LEVIN, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: A
PRACTICAL LAWYERING COURSE xi (2d ed. 2016), which gives prominent treatment to
preemption and the canon of narrow construction of statutes in derogation of the common law.
Most observers regard the latter as archaic, but some state courts still use it.
248. Scholarly interest in state interpretive methods—for example, Gluck, supra note 1—is a
terrific development, but that work focuses on states that have generated some theoretically
interesting developments. Most states, like most of everything else, are probably theoretically
boring.

